The Russian elite have realized that the country will have to live in a new reality that differs from the past rosy dreams of integration with the West, while preserving its independence and sovereignty. Yet they have not yet used the confrontation and the growth of patriotism for an economic revival.
The development of the Russian Far East, which has been declared by President Putin a “national priority for the 21st century” has so far not fully lived up to expectations. The key problem is that numerous tools for an accelerated development of the region are used without a clear idea of what its future should be like and without an analysis of its competitive advantages and factors that restrain economic growth. This article analyzes these advantages and restraints through the lens of the new international trade theory and new economic geography. The focus is on economies of scale, the use of the advantages of which is a prerequisite for the competitiveness of companies producing manufactured goods. According to these theories, the main obstacles to accelerated growth in the Russian Far East are the insufficient size of the market and the continuous population distribution pattern, a Soviet legacy which makes it impossible to use the benefits of agglomeration.
The Syrian experience may prove to be a model for a new approach to the organization of the army. In the Middle East, this institution continues to play not only a military but also a political role as a state-forming element of the political system.
Russia’s soft power should develop a broad and long-term narrative, capable of giving constructive answers to challenges facing Russian and Western societies. Berdyaev’s model of liberal conservatism can serve as the basis for an alternative discourse
China is Russia’s most important and responsible partner in the international arena. The five years that have passed since the beginning of the fundamental complication of relations between Russia and the West have shown that despite prejudices and lack of trust at the grassroots level, relations between the two countries remain friendly. Moscow and Beijing and the citizens of both countries, share common approaches toward what rights and freedoms mean in relations between states and have common values ??regarding the future world order. Therefore, it is very important for Russia to carefully consider the internal and external processes in China and to understand in which situations and circumstances our friends and allies will be limited in their actions and in which they may need our help. This is particularly important in regions where China’s foreign policy opponents have resources that allow them to relatively destabilize the situation.
The fast build-up of China’s military power is a natural and inevitable process, albeit belated. China is only bringing its military capability into line with the scale of its economy, territory and population. More importantly, it is taking systematic and very costly efforts to make its armed forces ready for active combat operations in remote regions of the world.
Massive restrictive measures related to the need to respond properly to the challenge of the pandemic spread of coronavirus infections is quite possibly the factor that was needed to recognise that the “liberal world order” has completely disintegrated.
A society that allows glaring inequality is likely to pay a higher price for getting out of the crisis caused by the pandemic, a Valdai Club expert says. This means more deaths, greater impoverishment risks for a part of the population, and most likely a deeper crisis. So, addressing the problem of excessive income inequality is a prerogative for more than just social policy.
Those institutions that helped smooth out the consequences of industrialisation and the destruction of traditional society in Europe in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries are being pushed aside by new forms of human interaction. In international politics, the institutions we know have also become a response to the challenges of the general and destructive nature of war. But now the world of national states is facing new challenges and has new opportunities. Therefore, the existing institutions will also be replaced in 20-30 years by organisations that we do not even know yet.
Those who are used to thinking of foreign policy and diplomacy as some sort of ceremonious activity should forget the Congress of Vienna and Helsinki talks. The time of intellectual battles between responsible professionals behind closed doors is gone. Now everything is put on display.
The Russian-U.S. confrontation provoked by the Ukrainian crisis is most often viewed as a purely regional phenomenon. However, its roots are much deeper than the problems faced by Ukraine; its nature is much more complex than the ongoing geopolitical struggle for that country; and its consequences affect the United States’ relations with other centers of power and global governance in general. The outcome of the Ukrainian conflict will likely determine the rules of relations among the great powers for decades to come.
The article describes how social and political changes in post-Soviet Russia over the past quarter of a century have been read and assessed by Chinese experts in relevant fundamental monographs. Each of the monographs considered herein, published in China twelve years apart, reviews different stages in the evolution of Chinese experts’ approach towards Russia, and states their analytical, ideological and political conclusions. Generally speaking, China’s sociopolitical Russian studies have evolved from the ideologically motivated resentment against the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the disbandment of its Communist Party and the ensuing shock reforms of the 1990s to the recognition of irreversible changes in Russia and “legitimization” of the Russian leadership in the 2000s-2010s. However, by the end of the current decade, the topic of uncertainty about Russia’s future sociopolitical and economic development has once again surfaced in some key publications along with increasingly “panegyrical” assessments of the Russian president.
Russia in Global Affairs Editor Alexander Solovyov talks with Vladimir P. Lukin about the intellectual misery of political science, the will of people and the power of things, the reassessment of the Cold War and national interests, “the society of the spectacle” in the 21st century and the advance of artificial intelligence, about attempts to run away from present-day reality into the future, and many other disturbing modern tendencies.
The European Union’s development vector will largely depend on Germany, the engine of the European economy and integration. Europe in general and Germany in particular are at a crossroads. Strained relations with the United States, the migration crisis, the rise of populism, climate change, and China’s economic boom push relations with Russia into the background. How do young Germans see the future of Europe and their own country? To answer this question, it is essential to take a look at the entire spectrum of political trends in Germany and to analyze which of them evoke the greatest response from the younger generation.
Ideological rivalry or trash discourse
The 2020 pandemic has marked a turning point in many processes: globalization, regionalization, and the struggle of nation-states for survival. Many had expected something like this, and the reaction of states and societies to the new virus was unexpectedly strong and profound. Under the slogan of combating the epidemic, many countries started doing openly what they had wanted to do for a long time: closing borders, strengthening sovereignty, bringing back production operations from abroad, and shifting relations with neighbors to a bilateral footing
Russian-Chinese relations in the last 20 years are a story of slow but steady progress. Both Moscow and Beijing have made multiple attempts to radically accelerate this progress, generally ending in failure. That being said, neither the breakdown of individual projects, nor the short-term rapprochement between Russia and the United States after September 11, nor the economic crises of 2009 and 2014 could stop the development of bilateral relations.