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Working paper

Анализ последствий реформы квот и голосов участников МВФ с точки зрения распределения влияния

Погорельский К. Б.
In this paper I investigate the results of the recent Quota and Voice Reform, adopted by the International Monetary Fund in April 2008, by means of formal voting power analysis. Using classical and preference-based power indices, I demonstrate that although the relative changes in power of some members are basically in line with the stated goals of the Reform (e.g., more voice for the low-income countries), the resulting power re-distribution is hardly significant, if viewed in absolute terms. I argue that the main reasons for this situation are the current distribution of quota shares and the substantially limited ability of the Fund to act, which results from the supermajority decision making rule requiring an immense degree of support among members for any reallocation of the quotas to come into force.