Dictators’ Behavior Under Conditions of Economic Sanctions Cumulative Effect
We investigate a model of one-stage bidding between two differently informed stockmarket agents for a risky asset (share). The random liquidation price of a share may take two values: the integer positive m with probability p and 0 with probability 1−p. Player 1 (insider) is informed about the price, Player 2 is not. Both players know the probability p. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. Both players propose simultaneously their bids. The player who posts the larger bid buys one share from his opponent for this price. Any integer bids are admissible. The model is reduced to a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side. We construct the solution of this game for any p and m: we find the optimal strategies of both players and describe recurrent mechanism for calculating the game value. The results are illustrated by means of computer simulation.
Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.
To beginning of XXI century the most of states of post-Soviet period have formed the own political systems. Predominance in political consciousness of inhabitants the traditions, the mythologized generally accepted opinions in combination with severe struggle for the power have attached to political process the contradictory character bringing sometimes to constitutional crisis' or to superficial reforms.
The authors investigate behavioural assumptions underlying the normal performance of market economy. It is assumed that a model of man adequate for market economy can be deduced from the ideal-typical properties of the latter. The main components of such model are rationality and morality. Main ethical categories relevant for market economy are analyzed: trust, justice, equality, virtues, freedom as well as their treatment in modern economics. Behavioural properties specifi c for modern Russian economy are discussed.
In this paper, we want to introduce experimental economics to the field of data mining and vice versa. It continues related work on mining deterministic behavior rules of human subjects in data gathered from experiments. Game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work with this data. Equilibria also known as game-theoretic predictions solely succeed with experienced subjects in specific games – conditions, which are rarely given. Contemporary experimental economics offers a number of alternative models apart from game theory. In relevant literature, these models are always biased by philosophical plausibility considerations and are claimed to fit the data. An agnostic data mining approach to the problem is introduced in this paper – the philosophical plausibility considerations follow after the correlations are found. No other biases are regarded apart from determinism. The dataset of the paper “Social Learning in Networks” by Choi et al 2012 is taken for evaluation. As a result, we come up with new findings. As future work, the design of a new infrastructure is discussed.
The collection contains papers accepted for the Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 28–30, 2010, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.
Reaction–diffusion type replicator systems are investigated for the case of a bimatrix. An approach proposed earlier for formalizing and analyzing distributed replicator systems with one matrix is applied to asymmetric conflicts. A game theory interpretation of the problem is described and the relation between dynamic properties of systems and their game characteristics is determined. The stability of a spatially homogeneous solution for a distributed system is considered and a theorem on maintaining stability is proved. The results are illustrated with two-dimensional examples in the case of distribution.
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.