State Ideology in Russia as a Generator of International Conflicts
The proposed analysis is devoted to the peculiarities of state ideology in Russia in the 2010s. The main hypothesis formulated in this work is that since 2012, there has been a sharp turn to right-wing conservatism in the state policy of the Russian Federation, and that the concepts of active militarism and isolationism have become the prevailing ideology of official discourse. Initially, this ideology was used more as an effective tool to mobilize the population, but since 2014, it has begun to drive Russia’s foreign policy and Russian politicians relied on it to “justify” both the annexation of Crimea and the wider Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
In our opinion, after examining the internal logic of this ideology, one can understand the basic program of the domestic and foreign policy that Russian political elites have been following since 2012. We see this program as an outgrowth of this ideology. It creates a picture of the world according to which this sort of conflict-generating behavior is not only justified but unavoidable. As it becomes a social fact, this ideological rhetoric transforms into a plan of action which is implemented by the political elites who adhere to it.
In addition, we will show that although this ideological project still appears to be dominant in both the official and public spheres, it would be reductive to exclude other trends from an analysis of the political situation in Russia. Although the alternative points of view that exist are still not strong enough to develop into full-scale political structures and ideological concepts, they have the potential for growth. At the same time, the dominant ideology of active militarism and isolationism is too rigid to occupy a leading position in federal policy for long.