La motivation de la réduction phénoménologique : la téléologie de l’intentionnalité, entre activité et passivité
Pour Edmund Husserl, la philosophie en tant que science de la totalité de l’étant se donne pour tâche la mise en question radicale de cet étant. Elle a besoin de s’affranchir du « ce qui va de soi » (Selbstverständlichkeit) du monde afin de saisir le sens d’être de ce monde. La rupture avec ce qui va de soi, qui sera cultivée dans l’attitude philosophique promue par Husserl, ne donne aucune réponse immédiate et ne fournit aucune résolution provisoire aux problèmes posés. Le philosophe se trouve dans l’inintelligibilité principielle de l’univers, et il sait que, peut-être, il va passer toute sa vie à approcher la donation adéquate de cette problématique. En tant que sujet empirique, il peut avoir une motivation arbitraire quelconque pour son activité philosophique, mais en tant que pur sujet de la connaissance, il se laisse diriger exclusivement par la « curiosité » théorique et par l’étonnement.
The volume contains the articles intitially held as talk at the conference "Is this real? Phenomenologies of the imaginary" at the Central-European Institute of Philosophy" (19-22.11.2013) as result of the research projects “Philosophical Investigations of the Body Experiences: Transdisciplinary Perspectives” (GAP 401/0/1164) and “Relevance of Subjectivity” (M300091201) in the Department of the Contemporary Continental Philosophy of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, Prague.
We investigate the parallelism between aesthetic experience and the practice of phenomenology using Viktor Shklovsky's theory of 'estrangement' (ostranenie). In his letter to Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Husserl claims that aesthetic and phenomenological experiences are similar; in the perception of a work of art we change our attitude in order to concentrate on how the things appear to us instead of what they are. A work of art 'forces us into' the aesthetic attitude in the same way as the phenomenological epoché drives us into the phenomenological one. The change of attitudes is a condition of possibility of aesthetic and/or phenomenological experience. Estrangement is an artistic device that breaks the routinised forms of perception: one sees the thing as new and does not just "recognise" it automatically. Shklovsky insists that it is possible if one experiences or feels the form of the work of art - in an affective and even sensuous way. We claim that this is similar to the phenomenological seeing, or intuition, which, according to Husserl, should be devoid of all understanding. Phenomenological epoché can also be described as a philosophical technique that aims to arrest the 'ready-made', 'taken for granted', 'pre-given' meanings in order to access a new meaning which is not yet stabilised, the "meaning-in-formation". It is not enough to turn from what appears to how it appears; one has to oscillate between these conflicting attitudes, or rather to keep them both at the same time thus gaining a kind of a 3D-vision of meaning in its becoming. This double life in two different attitudes (or, following a Husserlian metaphor, 'double bookkeeping') can be clarified in terms of Roman Jakobson's theory of antinomic coexistence between the poetic and communicative functions of language. The notion of 'double life in two attitudes' uncovers the role that ostranenie can play in the philosophical transformation of the subject based on variety and essential mobility of the affective components involved. Proposing a phenomenological interpretation of a passage from Samuel Beckett we show how the radicalisation of ostranenie can lead even to 'meta-estrangement': to estrangement of the everyday 'lack of estrangement'. We conclude with a remark on the productivity of this form of estrangement in the phenomenological context.
In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ Heidegger never tells us what enables words to work artistically and thereby bring beings into being. Therefore, this essay looks back to Being and Time, forward to Heidegger’s later essays on language, and laterally to the writings of Wittgenstein to see how words work, how words open up a world, and how words work as works of art.
Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp’s book The Mediated Construction of Reality published by Polity Press presents an attempt at reconsidering the classics of social theory, namely Berger and Luckmann’s phenomenology. Half a century after the appearance of The Social Construction of Reality two renowned media researchers ask questions anew about the ways of making and understanding the social world. This world nowadays has become profoundly mediatized, therefore the social gets increasingly rooted in the technological infrastructure of digital communication. The pervasive mediatization of social life transforms all its segments, on both micro- and macro-levels. The algorithms of social media and other computer systems quantify and automate social processes which used to be perceived as qualitative. In order to understand this world, social theory has to revise its approaches and basic notions. According to Couldry and Hepp, the classical optics of Berger and Luckmann’s social constructionism is no longer suitable. They develop a materialist phenomenology, which emphasizes the role of media technologies in constructing the social world. Furthermore, these authors regard the social world as a complex network of figurations, using and adapting the ideas of Norbert Elias. Their work has a pronounced critical purpose: the authors are concerned about the relative autonomy of social life, which is coming under control of technological systems’ imperatives, dictated by their developers’ commercial interests. The time is approaching when the social is no longer constructed in everyday human interactions, but produced by means of various media platforms instead. These platforms nowadays provide us with access to the social world and constitute its space. Does this mean the end of social construction of reality, as well as the end of social constructionism?
In this paper, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenological understanding of the unity of the world can be traced back to the Aristotelian principle of unity in the Metaphysics. This explains how the world is one: accidentally and necessarily, as true and false, potentially and actually, and categorically. But if these four ways of being one may be traced back to presence and absence, it is because they are modifications of implication.
Carnap took Heidegger to task for the production of ‘philosophical nonsense’. Carnap’s criterion for classifying Heidegger’s assertions as nonsense is rooted in the Logical Positivists' 'principle of verification’. According to this principle, a sentence has literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expresses is either analytic or empirically verifiable. The most obvious (or ironic) criticism of the verification principle is the extent to which it is nonsense on its own terms (i.e. it is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable), but from a Heideggerian point of view the most fruitful critique of the verification principle comes from WVO Quine and Wilfird Sellars: namely, that the verification principle assume words and sentences have a direct relation to a given empirical reality without explaining how that reality is given. And in this essay, I argue that Heidegger's so-called 'philosophical nonsense' represents a concrete attempt to explain the conditions through which empirical reality is presented to human beings such that our signs can meaningfully correspond to it.
Cet ouvrage vise à déterminer la manière de travailler qui est propre à la philosophie phénoménologique et à la montrer à l’œuvre. Il s’agit pour cela de définir le changement phénoménologique d’attitude comme « dé-limitation » de la vie de la conscience et la méthode phénoménologique comme « enrichissement mobile de sens », pour apercevoir que la dé-limitation, à travers l’enrichissement de sens, conduit à l’institution d’un nouveau mode de recherche. Mais de quelles limitations le changement d’attitude libère-t-il ? Qu’apporte l’enrichissement de sens qui soit proprement nouveau ? Dans quelle mesure cette « nouveauté » serait-elle instituée dans le cadre de la phénoménologie ?
This book examines phenomenology as working philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie), that is, as an open research project. The main aim of the study consists in determining the mode of performance (Vollzugsweise) of the phenomenological work in progress. To achieve this goal we provide an analysis of the doctrine of attitude (Part I.), the doctrine of method (Part II.), and then the “flexible” architectonics (Part III.) of phenomenology. These elaborations enable us to thematize the de-limitation of consciousness (Entschränkung), the enrichment of sense (Sinnbereicherung) and the institution of the new as the characteristic features of the phenomenological method of operating. This research project requires a constant oscillation between an open systematization of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and particular phenomenological analyses.
The article discusses the mode of existence of the world as described in Husserl's philosophy. The central concept is that of the "relative apodicticity". The world-existence is related ton the continous concordance of the experience. The interpretation is based on the partially unpublished manuscript Husserl's - B I 13.