Solution for One-Stage Bidding Game with Incomplete Information
We investigate a model of one-stage bidding between two differently informed stockmarket agents for a risky asset (share). The random liquidation price of a share may take two values: the integer positive m with probability p and 0 with probability 1−p. Player 1 (insider) is informed about the price, Player 2 is not. Both players know the probability p. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. Both players propose simultaneously their bids. The player who posts the larger bid buys one share from his opponent for this price. Any integer bids are admissible. The model is reduced to a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side. We construct the solution of this game for any p and m: we find the optimal strategies of both players and describe recurrent mechanism for calculating the game value. The results are illustrated by means of computer simulation.
We study Bertrand competition models with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where uncertainty is given by independent identically distributed random variables. It turns out that Bayesian Nash equilibria of the simplest of these games are described as Cournot prices. Then we discuss general conditions when Cournot prices give Bayesian Nash equilibria for Bertrand games with incomplete information about rivals' costs.
Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.
Reaction–diffusion type replicator systems are investigated for the case of a bimatrix. An approach proposed earlier for formalizing and analyzing distributed replicator systems with one matrix is applied to asymmetric conflicts. A game theory interpretation of the problem is described and the relation between dynamic properties of systems and their game characteristics is determined. The stability of a spatially homogeneous solution for a distributed system is considered and a theorem on maintaining stability is proved. The results are illustrated with two-dimensional examples in the case of distribution.
In this paper, we want to introduce experimental economics to the field of data mining and vice versa. It continues related work on mining deterministic behavior rules of human subjects in data gathered from experiments. Game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work with this data. Equilibria also known as game-theoretic predictions solely succeed with experienced subjects in specific games – conditions, which are rarely given. Contemporary experimental economics offers a number of alternative models apart from game theory. In relevant literature, these models are always biased by philosophical plausibility considerations and are claimed to fit the data. An agnostic data mining approach to the problem is introduced in this paper – the philosophical plausibility considerations follow after the correlations are found. No other biases are regarded apart from determinism. The dataset of the paper “Social Learning in Networks” by Choi et al 2012 is taken for evaluation. As a result, we come up with new findings. As future work, the design of a new infrastructure is discussed.
The authors investigate behavioural assumptions underlying the normal performance of market economy. It is assumed that a model of man adequate for market economy can be deduced from the ideal-typical properties of the latter. The main components of such model are rationality and morality. Main ethical categories relevant for market economy are analyzed: trust, justice, equality, virtues, freedom as well as their treatment in modern economics. Behavioural properties specifi c for modern Russian economy are discussed.
We consider the problem of selecting a predetermined number of objects from a given finite set. It is assumed that the preferences of the decisionmaker on this set are only partially known. Our solution approach is based on the notions of optimal and non-dominated subsets. The properties of such subsets and the objects they contain are investigated. The implementation of the developed approach is discussed and illustrated by various examples.
The collection contains papers accepted for the Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 28–30, 2010, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.