Contributions to game theory and management
The collection contains papers accepted for the Fifth International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 27-29, 2011, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management.
A model of contract theory is studied, where the objective functions of a regulation body and firms of two types involve ecological variables. It is shown that the way of working of the regulation mechanism (separating or pooling) depends on both political condition (regulators of what type set mechanism and contracts), and on economic conditions (distinction between “dirty” and “green” firms in efficiency and a degree of their spreading in the economy).
We investigate a model of one-stage bidding between two differently informed stockmarket agents for a risky asset (share). The random liquidation price of a share may take two values: the integer positive m with probability p and 0 with probability 1−p. Player 1 (insider) is informed about the price, Player 2 is not. Both players know the probability p. Player 2 knows that Player 1 is an insider. Both players propose simultaneously their bids. The player who posts the larger bid buys one share from his opponent for this price. Any integer bids are admissible. The model is reduced to a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side. We construct the solution of this game for any p and m: we find the optimal strategies of both players and describe recurrent mechanism for calculating the game value. The results are illustrated by means of computer simulation.