Государство и его кризис: от ранних до несостоявшихся государств.
The Working Paper examines the peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.
The paper proposes a political and legal approach to conceptualizing modern democratic state as law-governed, social and secular. It defines legal, institutional, and socio-political characteristics of law-governed, social, and secular state.
The dissertation is devoted to one of the most pressing issues of modern literary criticism — canon formation studies. Until now, most of the scholarly investigations have focused on the anonymous sociological mechanisms of canon formation. The role of another important factor — literary criticism — has not yet been described sufficiently. By ranking writers aesthetically, the critics constructed a synchronic hierarchy that ostensibly had its summit in the person of the “head of literature” («глава литературы»). The process of competition and selection of hierarchies resulted in the emergence of the historical phenomenon understood as literary canon. The thesis explores for the first time the cultural role of Russian literary criticism of the 1830–60s in this process and in the development of the critical concept “head of literature”. Literary polemics from the period under study comprise the research material for the dissertation. This was a time when famous Russian critics V. Belinsky, A. Grigorjev and N. Chernyshevsky proclaimed writers N. Gogol A. Ostrovsky and the critic N. Dobroliubov as “heads of literature”. Since literary criticism in this way tried to guide literature and to plan its future, the concept “head of literature” is discussed as a cultural myth that was formed in the process of nation building upon the foundation of a national literature. The origins of such conception of criticism (the so called “romantische Programmatik”) go back to the ideology of German Romanticism, in particular to F. Schlegel’s ideas, the transfer of which into Russian criticism is also explored in the thesis. An exploration of the wider European context of aesthetic ideas and the historical semantics of pivotal aesthetic concepts such as “genius”, “nationality”, “artistry” has allowed to explain the sources of many of the literary polemics of the 1830–60s. The dissertation offers a new interpretation of the literary debates between Belinsky and Gogol, Belinsky and Shevyrjov (1830s), the critical discussions of A. Ostrovsky’s debut as a playwright (1850–52), and the repercussions of the early death of critic N. Dobroilubov (1861). All these polemics are regarded as a symptom of the critics’ continuous struggle for power in the literary field and for the right to construct a particular literary future. Ultimately, this interdisciplinary approach (based on the intersection of canon formation studies, history of aesthetic concepts, and the historic-functional method) gives us a new picture of the history of Russian literary criticism and literature itself, one that places them in context of the European Romantic thought.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.