Религиозность и толерантность к осуждаемым религией формам поведения (по материалам Европейского исследования ценностей)
The generosity of social policy depends on a country’s economic development levels, which, in turn, determine how much the state can redistribute and use to help those in need. However, particular social policies in a given country also depend on citizen preferences and their perceptions of whether it is necessary to help certain categories of people in need, as well as how far the state should intervene in the economy. Unlike most studies that explain differences in social policy preferences with reference to socio-economic factors, this literature review focuses on religion as a cultural predictor of welfare attitudes. Religion can influence individual redistribution preferences by creating the overall cultural context and setting the standards for helping those in need, as well as via determining believers’ perceptions of who deserves help and how these social support measures should be implemented. The paper offers a review of the mechanisms through which religion can shape individual attitudes towards social policy and, based on these existing studies, analyses whether there are differences in welfare attitudes between followers of different religious traditions, as well as between religious and non-religious individuals in contemporary Europe. Firstly, the paper studies how different modes of interaction between churches and secular states, as well as differences in the content of religious traditions, can lead to the formation of distinctive attitudes towards poverty and, as a consequence, to the formation of distinctive welfare provision regimes in Europe. Following this, the paper reviews how redistribution preferences can be affected by individual religiosity (religious affiliation and degree of religiosity), and identifies the mechanisms through which religion can substitute the state social institutions for its followers.
The article is devoted to the study of the relationship between existential fulfilment as one of the indicators of psychological well-being, and religiosity among Russian citizens practicising Islam and Buddhism. We also compare existential fulfillment of Muslims and Buddhists and Russians from the general population. We understand existential fulfilment, based on A. Lӓngle’s existential analytical approach, as the personal realization of the four fundamental existential motivations (FMs). We first briefly consider how the main themes of the FMs are reflected in the world outlook and practice of both Islam and Buddhism. In an empirical study on a sample of Muslims (N = 181) and Buddhists (N = 131) we used the original Russian version of the Test of Existential Motivation and an “objective” indicator of religious involvement: a survey form for assessing religiosity level includes questions about the frequency of religious practices. A positive correlation was found between existential fulfilment and religiosity. Regression analysis showed that religiosity is a significant predictor of existential fulfilment, independent of the gender, age, place of residence of respondents and the method used for data collection. The level of realization of the 2nd FM, concerning emotionality and value of life, among Muslim participations, was significantly higher than among Buddhist participants. In the levels of realization of other existential fundamental motivations and in the general indicator of existential fulfilment, no significant differences were found between the representatives of two religious groups. Comparison of existential fulfilment indicators for Muslims and Buddhists with similar indicators for a neutral Russian sample from the general population demonstrated that the level of realization for all fundamental existential motivations was significantly higher for believers. Further studies are needed for testing our results in other countries and using representatives of other religions.
European countries are culturally close, still showing great variance in political participation rates as well as in predominant religions and state-church relations experience, what makes this region a good case for comparative research. Given this, it becomes important to study if members of different confessions differ in political participation rates, or the main cleavage lies between religious and non-religious people regardless of religious tradition? Does Orthodoxy really lead to lower levels of political participation or what we see is the effect of political regime or Communist legacy? Statistical analysis results suggest that regular attendance of religious services and praying does increase chances to participate in politics. This pattern holds for followers of all major European religious traditions and in countries with different predominant religions. On the other hand, most inter-confessional differences in political participation appear weak and unstable, while both belonging to an Orthodox religious tradition and living in a predominantly Orthodox state exert a stable and negative effect on political participation. Additional tests suggest that there is no difference in political participation between Orthodox Christians from predominantly Orthodox states and those where they form only a minority. Consequently, it is something in a religious tradition itself that decreases political participation.
Religion or Communist Legacy? The Influence of Religion on Welfare Attitudes in Europe
The paper studies whether welfare attitudes of the Europeans are effected by religiosity of individual- (via degree of religiosity and religious affiliation) and contextual-level (via predominant religion and average religiosity). Results of multilevel statistical analysis performed on the data from ESS-2008 for 27 countries of Europe suggest that religiosity is negatively associated with welfare support as well as being a Catholic or a Protestant. On the contrary, Orthodox Christianity leads to substantive increase in welfare support among respondents as both individual religious affiliation and predominant religion. Finally, in countries without Communist experience religiosity is visibly associated with decline in welfare support, while in PostCommunist countries all respondents are similarly supportive of welfare provision, and more religiosity does not lead to decline in welfare support.
The article discusses the concept of "religious person", the substructure of personality religious rights (religious consciousness and religious behavior and religious relations), analyzes the reasons for the classification types of believers, these foreign and domestic authors.