Book
Влияние выбора целей и инструментов политики денежных властей на уязвимость экономик
М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В.
Chapters
Евдокимова Т. В., Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М. В кн.: Влияние выбора целей и инструментов политики денежных властей на уязвимость экономик. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012. С. 65-117.
Added: Oct 27, 2016
Similar publications
Алексашенко С. В., Петроневич М. В. Экономическая политика. 2011. № 3. С. 81-92.
Added: Oct 10, 2012
Малышева М. А. В кн.: Опыт преодоления кризиса – свободные рынки и усиление государственного контроля (российско-германский опыт). Сборник докладов международной научно-практической конференции. СПб.: ГУАП, 2010. С. 114-116.
Added: Feb 17, 2013
Хасянова С. Ю., Потапов Д. В. В кн.: Современные проблемы в области экономики, менеджмента, бизнес-информатики, юриспруденции и социально- гуманитарных наук. Материалы IV научно- практической конференции студентов и преподавателей НФ ГУ-ВШЭ. Н. Новгород: Нижегородский государственный технический университет им. Р.Е. Алексеева, 2006. С. 57-60.
Added: Dec 16, 2012
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Сорокина А. В. и др. М.: Издательство «Дело» РАНХ, 2010.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Могилат А. Н., Ачкасов Ю. К., Климовец А. В. и др. Вопросы экономики. 2016. № 5.
Added: May 14, 2016
Zamulin O. A., Sosunov K. A. Научные труды ЦЭФИР и РЭШ. WP101-1. ЦЭФИР и РЭШ, 2007. No. 101.
The paper studies monetary policy in an economy, in which the manufacturing sector is ousted completely by the presence of a large natural resource industry. Thus, the economy produces only non-tradable goods, which can complement or substitute imported goods, and the primary shock to the economy comes from the ”uctuations in the world price of the exported commodity. A model of such an economy is calibrated using parameters relevant for Russia, which is an example of an economy sick with Dutch Disease, and several conventional policy rules are considered. It is shown that in absence of a well-functioning “scal stabilization fund, it may be optimal for monetary authorities to respond to the real exchange rate, as the Bank of Russia allegedly does, using purchases of foreign reserves as the policy instrument. The logic of these actions is to replace the absent “scal stabilization policy. In case monetary policy is conducted using an interest rate instrument, there should be no reaction to the real exchange rate and only slight one - to intiation.
Added: Apr 22, 2013
Dobrynskaya V. V. Исследования по экономике и финансам. WP9. Высшая школа экономики, 2008. No. 02.
We build a New Keynesian model of a small open economy and analyze the optimal monetary policy assuming symmetric and asymmetric price rigidity. We find that, in the presence of asymmetric price rigidity, inflationary and deflationary shocks should be treated asymmetrically, and the optimal direction of the asymmetry depends on the price rigidity and the social preferences. In particular, if prices are sufficiently flexible and/or the output gap is not very important (e.g. strict inflation targeting), then inflationary shocks should be contracted more severely than deflationary ones of the same size should be accommodated. But in the opposite case the optimal asymmetry is reversed. We test the predictions of our model for a set of developed countries, concentrating on the exchange rate policy. We find that the exchange rate plays a significant role in the monetary policy in most countries, and we find some evidence of the asymmetry which is in line with inflation targeting according to our model.
Added: Mar 18, 2013
Трунин П. В., Князев Д. А., Сатдаров А. М. М.: Институт Гайдара, 2010.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Sokolov V., Mark N. In bk.: VIII Международная научная конференция. Модернизация экономики и общественное развитие: В 3 кн.. Bk. 1. M.: Higher School of Economics Publishing House, 2007. P. 242-251.
Using a panel data set of 180 countries spanning from 1971 to 2000, we find evidence that exchange rate policy affects macroeconomic performance for the sample of non-industrialized countries. We consider two measures of economic performance: i) per capita GDP growth and ii) the volatility of per capita GDP growth and investigate the nature of their dependence on de facto/de jure mix of exchange rate policies. Our characterization of exchange rate policy measures whether a country's de facto policy is consistent with its publicly stated de jure exchange rate regime. Employing the Rogoff and Reinhart (2002) de facto classification we find the significant statistical relationship between exchange rate policy and growth which is robust to the inclusion of conventional growth control variables. Our nuanced characterization shows that the non-industrialized countries exhibiting `fear of floating,' have higher GDP growth. With respect to GDP volatility a division of policy into fixed versus floating exchange rates using the de facto/de jure metrics is significant and indicates that `fear of floating' is stabilizing for the non-industrialized but destabilizing for industrialized countries.
Added: Oct 3, 2013
Sosunov K. A., Ushakov N. Научные доклады лаборатории макроэкономического анализа. WP12. Высшая школа экономики, 2009. No. 02.
The equilibrium real exchange rate of Russian ruble is estimated for the period from the beginning
of 1995 to the beginning of 2008. According to the methodological approach proposed by Edwards
(1988) the equilibrium real exchange rate is a function of a set of fundamental variables (so-called “reduced
form equation”). In order to estimate an equilibrium real exchange rate a set of fundamentals was
selected: terms of trade, productivity differential, fiscal policy variable. Estimation was performed in a
cointegrated VAR framework using the Johansen cointegration test. The speed of adjustment of the actual
real exchange rate to the equilibrium real exchange rate as well as the influence of monetary policy
and private capital flows on the short-run dynamics of real exchange rate is explored.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Дмитриев М. Э. и др. М.: Издательство «Дело» РАНХ, 2010.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Жулин А. Б., Кнутов А. В., Синятуллина Л. Х. Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления. 2012. № 1. С. 185-190.
Added: May 24, 2012
Edited by: Г. В. Жданкин, Л. Н. Ирхина, А. Чиликов Н. Новгород: Нижегородская государственная сельскохозяйственная академия, 2010.
Added: May 15, 2012
Edited by: З. М. Саралиева, А. А. Иудин Вып. 1. Н. Новгород: Издательство НИСОЦ, 2011.
Added: May 11, 2012
Vernikov A. V. Eurasian Geography and Economics. 2012. Vol. 53. No. 2. P. 250-266.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
Added: May 15, 2012
Edited by: А. А. Иудин, З. М. Саралиева Вып. 13. Н. Новгород: Издательство НИСОЦ, 2010.
Added: May 15, 2012
Вишневская Н. Т. Проблемы рынка труда. WP3. Высшая школа экономики, 2005. № 03.
The paper examines the institute of minimum wage in developed and transition economies and in a number of the developing countries. First of all the institutional mechanism of minimum wage fixing is considered. One of the sections explores the dynamics of absolute and relative levels of minimum wage. The special attention is paid to the impact of the institute of minimum wage on the labour market. The author considers the mechanism of transmission of the minimum wage increases on the employment and unemployment dynamics. The paper also contains the result of the empirical research. The experience of many countries witnesses that large increases in minimum wage levels lead to the stagnation of the employ-ment, especially of the disadvantaged groups. The negative effect is larger for the companies with higher share of labour costs and more active use of unqualified labour, that is small businesses and agricultural enterprises. One of the main conclusions is that the minimum wage is not an effective tool of the poverty reduction as the majority of the recipients live in households of average and upper average income.
Added: Oct 13, 2012
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.
Added: May 22, 2012
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Added: Jun 24, 2011