Субъективность и идентичность
This paper is concerned with the evolution of the concept “subject” in the ancient Greek philosophy in comparison with Aristotle’s ontological concept of hypokeimenon. Hypokeimenonis understood not only in the grammatic and logic sense but also as substantional base or form, matter and individuum (prote ousia). In his identification of hypokeimenon and proteousia Aristotle gives understanding of the subject as independently existing substance andsets the foundation of the later anthropological interpretation of the self-identical person.
Michel Henry’s project of the passive or “pathetic” subjectivity is based on a presupposition that the essence of the self is constituted within the process of the self-affection of Life. The self is given to itself primarily not in reflection or theoretical thinking, but rather in passion, in undergoing emotional states. We argue that Henry’s claim of identity between passion and true thought is to be understood in the context of philosophical praxis, for example, of spiritual exercises or prescriptive meditations, rather than as a scientific description of the reality of the self.