ИНДЕКС РИСКОУСТОЙЧИВОСТИ ОТРАСЛЕЙ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОСТИ ― МАРТ 2020 г
Corruption in government procurements remains to be one of grave problems in transition economies. A reaction to this problem in Russia came in 2005-2006 in form of a radical reform of government procurements. This paper analyses the main parameters of firms participating in government procurements before and after changes in regulation. Our analysis is based on the data of a survey of 957 manufacturing enterprises conducted in 2009. The questionnaire included queries about participation of firms in supplies to government orders, the extent of «kickback» in public procurement system etc. A similar survey with the same sampling was conducted in 2005, and this enabled us to construct a panel of 499 firms and to have a unique opportunity for a comparison of the situation before and after the radical change in the legislation. Our regression analysis confirmed the hypotheses that in 2005, firms with government stakes, old firms (established before 1992) and larger firms had advantages in access to government orders. Our analysis of the 2009 data showed a substantial growth in the share of firms participating in government procurements. As before, large firms retain their advantages in access to government orders. However for the old firms, the corresponding coefficient became insignificant. On the other hand, firms that are located in more developed Russian regions have obtained advantages in access to government orders. Our analysis of the 2009 data also revealed that factors of active modernization of the enterprises (presence of large-scale investment projects in 2005-2008, exports, ISO certification) had no influence on access of the firms to government orders. At the same time, the fact of having fulfilled government orders in 2004 has positive influence on participation of a firm in government procurements in 2008. Estimated scales of «kickback» in 2009 were practically the same. The results of our analysis enable us to conclude that principal goals of the radical reform in 2005 were never achieved. The conclusion of our paper examines of the reason for this situation and formulates policy implications.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.