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Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 29
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Article
Alexander S. Skorobogatov. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2016. Vol. 32. No. 6. P. 512-541.

This paper uses the famous events related to Pussy Riot as a natural experiment to examine the effect of alternative media on church membership. A difference-in-differences strategy is used to explore the effect in question. The hypothesis is that, given a lack of religious background in the majority of the population and strong temporary interest in religious issues promoted by a particular provocative event, mass media substantially affect religious choice. To check if this is the case, I compare the dynamics of religious choice of those exposed to alternative media reports on church topics and the rest of the population. As a proxy of familiarity with an alternative view, I use a dummy variable for using the Internet to obtain news. The main finding is that, during the experiment run over the year 2012, the growth of self-reported Orthodox believers was significantly lower in the treatment group than in the control group. Exposure to alternative media coverage turned out to heavily affect religious choice.

Added: Nov 13, 2015
Article
Melville A. Y., Mironyuk M. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2016. Vol. 32. No. 2. P. 132-151.

This article contributes to current discussions on state capacity, quality of institutions, and political regimes. Our analysis demonstrates that the J-curve argument (“good institutions” in autocracies as compared to hybrid and transitional regimes) may not be generic and is not well supported by empirical evidence from the sample of post-Soviet countries. An explanatory model of the “King of the Mountain” is instead provided. Its focus is on the monopoly of political rent as a precondition for extraction of economic rent. It demonstrates an inverse correlation between the quality of institutions and the extraction of political and economic rent, and explains why an autocrat may not have an incentive to improve institutions that may make his/her monopoly vulnerable, and rather would prefer to preserve a low quality of institutions and “bad enough governance.” An analysis of a variety of external and domestic factors that may endanger this monopoly is provided. Finally, the autocrat's alternative strategic choices are analyzed. It is argued that better payoffs for the autocrat – paradoxically – may result from partial reforms and improvement of the quality of institutions. However, for various reasons, this is not occurring in post-Soviet autocracies.

Added: Jun 23, 2015
Article
Remington T. F. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2017. Vol. 33. No. 4. P. 313-333.

Upgrading skill formation has become an increasingly urgent task for societies facing the challenges of rapid technological change and globalization. However, reform of systems of vocational education and training (VET) poses severe challenges for aligning the interests of schools, firms, households, and governments, even in societies with relatively efficient markets for labor and education. Where market institutions are poorly developed, these challenges are particularly acute, resulting in endemic mismatches between the supply and demand of skill. Currently governments in many countries, including the United States, Russia, and China, are seeking to adopt elements of the German dual education model. The Russian federal government has undertaken several initiatives designed to upgrade VET by encouraging closer cooperation of vocational schools and firms at the regional level, including the adoption of dual education programs. This paper focuses on one such project: a 2013 pilot program administered by the Russian Agency for Strategic Initiatives, to foster the development of new models of dual education. The paper compares the 13 pilot regions with regions that submitted proposals but were not selected and with all other regions along multiple economic, social, demographic, and institutional dimensions. The findings suggest hypotheses about the conditions that enabled the pilot regions to take advantage of federal policies encouraging the adoption of dual education. More generally, the paper sheds light on institutional solutions to collective action dilemmas in skill formation in transitional and developing societies.

Added: Apr 7, 2017
Article
Liudmila Zasimova, Kolosnitsyna M. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2018. Vol. 34. No. 6. P. 412-429.

This study seeks to discuss the survivability of charitable NGOs in Russia without foreign funding. We use cross-section data from a quantitative household survey conducted in April 2016 to investigate common giving patterns of Russians. Using statistic and regression analysis, we explore causes of donations and individual and social attributes of charitable giving in general and to NGO in particular. We find that Russians prefer direct giving to people in need rather than to NGOs; the donations are small, spontaneous and irregular; they are mainly targeted to support poor and unhealthy. Involvement in religion activities and higher self-assessed income are two factors, which contribute most to the probability of donating. Educated and younger donors are more likely to donate to NGOs compared to donating to particular people/families. The study suggests that private donations to NGOs will decline if no changes in public policy are made. NGOs supporting education, environment, culture or civil organizations seem to be worst-hit.

Added: Oct 5, 2018
Article
Rochlitz M. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. Vol. 30. No. 2. P. 89-114.

To what extend are Russian state agencies involved in predatory behaviour, and what are the determinants of their activities? Analysing a novel dataset containing 312 cases of illegal corporate raiding (reiderstvo) between 1999 and 2010, this paper identifies a shift both in the regional and sectoral distribution of raiding attacks over time, as well as an increasing participation of state agencies in criminal raiding attacks. Using panel regression analysis to look at the determinants of increasing state involvement, I find that election results for the ruling president and his party, as well as the degree to which elections are manipulated throughout Russia’s regions are significantly and positively correlated with the number of raiding attacks in a given region, while regions with governors that have stronger local ties are characterized by a smaller number of attacks. A potential interpretation of these findings is that the federal centre might tolerate a certain degree of predatory activities by regional elites, as long as these elites are able to deliver a sufficiently high level of electoral support for the centre, with the effect being weaker in regions where the governor is interested in the long-term development of the regional economy.

Added: Nov 13, 2013
Article
Chirikov I. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2016. Vol. 32. No. 4. P. 338-344.

This paper challenges the central claim of Natalia Forrat’s article that university support programs under Putin targeted the uppression of antiregime student mobilization. Empirical evidence, both on the national-policy level and on the level of higher education institutions, suggests that the government introduced support programs in order to establish a research capacity at Russian flagship universities and to develop a more competitive national science system. The low level of students’ political engagement can rather be attributed to the outdated structures of student representation, inherited from the Soviet period.

Added: Dec 25, 2015
Article
Paneyakh E. L. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. Vol. 30. No. 2-3. P. 115-136.
A specialist on Russian law enforcement examines a critical source of prosecution and conviction bias in that country – the system by which prosecutors, police, judges, and other legal professionals are evaluated. More specifically, she demonstrates how that system (exclusive of any inherent corruption or bias) institutionalizes incentives for the prosecution of large numbers of defendants in routine cases for the purpose of meeting informal quotas. Officials from a variety of law enforcement agencies, seeking to “hit their numbers,” develop techniques of selecting the “right” cases (and avoiding “wrong” ones), manipulating charges depending on the victim’s and defendant’s statuses.
Added: Mar 20, 2015
Article
Wegren S., Nikulin A., Trotsuk I. et al. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2015. Vol. 31. No. 5. P. 48-63.
Added: Jan 21, 2017
Article
Wegren S. K., Nikulin A., Trotsuk I. et al. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2015. Vol. 31. No. 5. P. 367-396.

Gender inequality in Russia's rural formal economy is examined using quantitative and qualitative data. Rural women continue to be underrepresented in farm managerial positions, and gendered income differences remain the norm. Rural women are underrepresented because they continue to have responsibility for most of the housework and child care. The traditional division of labor inside the household continues to dominate, thereby affecting women's career trajectories and earning potential. Value change about gendered roles in the formal economy has been minimal. © 2014 Taylor & Francis.

Added: Oct 22, 2014
Article
Krickovic A. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. Vol. 30. No. 6. P. 503-528.

After stagnating throughout most of the 1990s and 2000s, Russia’s efforts to

reintegrate the post-Soviet space are finally gathering momentum. According to

President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s goal is to establish a Eurasian Economic

Union “capable of becoming one of the poles in a futuremulti-polarworld.”Most

existing studies see Russia’s imperial and post-Soviet legacies as the driving

forces behind these efforts. Although they offer valuable insights, these studies

fail to explain the timing of Russia’s push for deeper regional integration. This

article examines these developments from a geopolitical perspective and

compares Eurasian regionalism with the regional integration projects of other

great powers (more specifically, Brazil and Mercosur/Unasur and China and

ASEAN þ 1). All three efforts are occurring at a time when the international

system is in flux and the ability of the USA and other Western powers to deliver

key global collective goods is being called into question. Regional integration

must ultimately be seen as a strategy by Russia and other great powers to respond

to these challenges and prepare themselves for an unpredictable future.

 

Added: Dec 11, 2014
Article
Frye T., Gehlbach S., Marquardt K. et al. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2017. Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 1-15.
Added: Jul 25, 2019
Article
Frye T. M., Gehlbach S. G., Marquadt K. L. et al. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2017. Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 1-15.

Vladimir Putin has managed to achieve strikingly high public approval ratings throughout his time as president and prime minister of Russia. But is his popularity real, or are respondents lying to pollsters? We conducted a series of list experiments in early 2015 to estimate support for Putin while allowing respondents to maintain ambiguity about whether they personally do so. Our estimates suggest support for Putin of approximately 80 percent, which is within ten percentage points of that implied by direct questioning. We find little evidence that these estimates are positively biased due to the presence of floor effects. In contrast, our analysis of placebo experiments suggests that there may be a small negative bias due to artificial deflation. We conclude that Putin's approval ratings largely reflect the attitudes of Russian citizens.

Added: Dec 24, 2015
Article
Schultz A., Kozlov V. A., Libman A. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. Vol. 30. No. 2-3. P. 137-170.

This paper investigates the effect of informal ties between court chairpersons and prosecutors on the repressive implementation of criminal justice in Russia in the area of fraud convictions. We use criminal law statistics of Russian regional courts for 2006-2010 and determine the alignment between chairpersons and prosecutors by measuring the length of their mutual career paths. The informal ties have a strong impact on trial outcome, which, however, changes over time. During periods of high bureaucratic risks and uncertainty, regions with higher extent of informal ties between judges and prosecutors exhibit more repressive law enforcement. If external risks decrease, informal coalitions seem to increase the independence of the courts, insulating them from bureaucratic pressures and limiting their repressiveness.

 

Added: Nov 15, 2013
Article
Libman A., Schultz A., Kozlov V. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. No. 30(2-3). P. 137-170.

This paper investigates the effect of informal ties between judges (as represented by regional court chairpersons) and prosecutors on the repressive implementation of criminal justice in Russia in the area of fraud convictions. The authors utilize criminal law statistics of Russian regional courts for 2006–2010 to determine the alignment between chairpersons and prosecutors by measuring the length of their mutual career paths. The informal ties have a strong impact on trial outcome, which, however, changes over time. During periods of high bureaucratic risks and uncertainty, regions with a higher extent of informal ties between judges and prosecutors exhibit more repressive law enforcement. If external risks decrease, informal coalitions seem to increase the independence of the courts, insulating them from bureaucratic pressures and limiting their repressiveness.

Added: Apr 21, 2014
Article
Grigoriev I. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2018. Vol. 34. No. 1. P. 17-34.

There is a normative expectation that constitutionalism does not co-exist well with autocracy. How do constitutional courts then uphold their integrity under authoritarianism? In this paper, I answer this question by taking the case of the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) and showing how court–government accommodation in the new post-third wave autocracies can be achieved by limiting the amount of information the court receives from its secretariat. It follows from a detailed analysis of case selection in the RCC that the secretariat can function as an “insulator,” protecting the Court from political and reputational risks. The two features that make this possible are its invisibility to the judges and the clerks’ specific professional culture. The research is informed by an extensive series of in-depth interviews in the RCC, and benefits from the relocation of the RCC to St. Petersburg in 2008.

Added: Jan 14, 2014
Article
Smyth R., Soboleva I. V. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. Vol. 30. No. 4. P. 257-275.

The arrest of the protest punk band Pussy Riot (PR) in February 2012 and the subsequent prosecution of three band members pose a significant puzzle for political science.  While PR’s performances presented a coherent alternative to the Putin regime’s image of Russian reality, it was unlikely that the discordant music and crude lyrics of their art protest would inspire Russian society to take to the streets.  Yet, the regime mounted a very visible prosecution against the three young women.  We argue that the trial marked a shift in the Kremlin’s strategy to shape state-society relations.  In the face of declining economic conditions and social unrest, the Pussy Riot trial encapsulated the Kremlin’s renewed focus on three related mechanisms to ensure social support: coercion, alliance building, and symbolic politics.  The Pussy Riot trial afforded the Kremlin an important opportunity to simultaneously redefine its loyal constituency, secure the Church-state relationship, and stigmatize the opposition. 

Added: Nov 13, 2013
Article
Yakovlev A. A., Sobolev A. S., Kazun A. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. No. 30 (2-3). P. 171-194.

In their most recent works, North and his coauthors (North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, S. Webb, and B. R. Weingast. 2012. In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; North, D.C., J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) name the formation of organizations capable of effectively restricting violence in society as a necessary condition for transition from developing societies to societies with sustainable economic growth. However, the mechanisms of emergence and conditions for the operation of such organizations in contemporary developing countries remain unclear. We follow the logic of formation of such organizations using the case study of collective actions of the Russian business community aimed at restricting “state violence” against business. We seek to identify the conditions leading to a shift in the choice of strategies from attempts at informal agreements with extortionists controlling means of coercion to cooperation of businessmen and trace the further evolution of organized forms of collective action. Finally, we assess to what extent the created organizations can be efficient and self-supporting in the long term.

Added: Jun 17, 2014
Article
Golikova V., Kuznetsov B. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2017. Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 49-62.

The paper is focused on assessing the risk factors for Russian manufacturing firms posed by sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU, US, and other countries in 2014. While there is an extensive literature assessing the successes and failures of international sanctions on the economies of both those imposing and targeted by sanctions on a macroeconomic level, we are more interested in trying to understand the corporate response – i.e. which firms evaluate the introduction and increasing scale of economic sanctions as a threat to their corporate strategy, and their possible reactions aimed at adjusting to a changing environment due to the geopolitical shock. Our research, based on a recent survey of manufacturing companies, provides evidence that over the last decade Russian manufacturing firms have become much more integrated into the global economy than is commonly assumed, through foreign direct investment, foreign trade (including imports of both technological equipment and raw materials and components), international partnerships, and by extensively supplying foreign companies that operate in Russia. Considering the self-selection effect of the top-performing firms in terms of foreign trade, we can state that sanctions could prove most harmful not only for the targeted firms, but for the entire population of better-performing and globalized firms involved in foreign trade with the EU and Ukraine. Thus, the impact of the sanctions on the prospects of the Russian manufacturing sector may be very strong over the medium-to-long term.

Added: Jun 15, 2016
Article
Treisman D. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2014. Vol. 30. No. 5.

This paper seeks to explain the surprising decline in Russian President Vladimir Putin's approval rating in 2011. During the previous 10 years, Putin's rating had correlated closely with Russians' perceptions of the state of the economy. Yet the fall in his approval – from 79% in December 2010 to 63% a year later – occurred despite roughly stable economic perceptions. Comparing Levada Center polls from late 2010 and 2011, the paper explores both who (what types of respondents) grew disenchanted with Putin, and why(what issues or grievances prompted this switch). It finds that (a) the fall in support for the Kremlin – although faster among members of the “creative class,” women, the rich, and residents of provincial cities – was broad-based, occurring among all social groups examined; (b) attitudes toward immigration, the West, and Russia's international status, as well as assessments of public service quality, changed little during 2011; (c) Putin's declining popularity most likely reflected stronger – not weaker – economic concerns; although the proportion judging economic performance to be poor did not increase, those who saw economic weakness became much less supportive of the Kremlin. Russians appear to have increasingly blamed their political leaders for unsatisfactory economic and political outcomes.

Added: Jan 20, 2015
Article
Reuter O. J. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2013. Vol. 29. No. 2. P. 101-135.

A political scientist examines how regional elites shape the electoral fortunes of Russia’s hegemonic party, United Russia (UR). Using original data on regional legislative elections from 2003 to 2011, we show that UR performs better in those regions where regional governors control strong political machines. Russia’s leadership undercut its own electoral strategy by replacing popular elected governors with colorless bureaucrats who struggled to mobilize votes on behalf of United Russia. This is one of the reasons for United Russia’s poor performance in recent elections.

Added: Jun 7, 2013
Article
Kuznetsov B., Dolgopyatova T. G., Golikova V. et al. Post-Soviet Affairs. 2011. Vol. 27. No. 4. P. 1-37.
Added: Nov 13, 2012
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