Таможенный союз ЕврАзЭс: сложный старт
The analysis of competition policy during economic crisis is motivated by the fact that competition is a key factor in productivity levels. The latter, in turn, influences the scope and length of economic recession. In many Russian markets, buyers’ gains decline because of weak competition, since suppliers are reluctant to cut prices despite decreasing demand. Data on prices in Russia and abroad in the second half of 2008 show asymmetric price rigidity. At least two questions are important in an economic crisis: the “division of labor” between proactive and protective tools of competition policy and the impact of anticrisis policy on competition. Protective competition policy is insufficient in a transition economy, especially during a crisis, and it should be supplemented with well-designed industrial policy measures that do not contradict the goals of competition. The preferred tools of anticrisis policy are those that do not restrain competition.
This paper puts forth a comprehensive set of measures to address the current economic crisis, prevent its further aggravation and ensure sustained and ongoing development of the Russian economy. In this study we seek to adopt the viewpoint of common sense and keep free from political and ideological bias. This is why we believe the proposed solutions should be implemented by any reasonable government irrespective of its political coloration. This text presents our vision of the Russian economy and its problems.
In the article we study the reasons and character of economic growth in Russia in the beginning of the XXI-st century. The analysis of the features of economic development is a key to understanding of depth of modern crisis in Russia. This article exhibits institutional preconditions for an overcoming the crisis and acceleration of economic growth.
Economic crisis started in 2008 forced companies in Russia to move from growth and expansion to reduction and restructuring. The article presents the main changes at top managers’ labor market from the beginning of crisis in Russia. The original data on top managers’ mobility in Russia from late 1999 till 2009 was used. The main result of the research is that there were no big changes in Russian top managers’ labor market during the crisis years (2008–2009). The most significant change was the increase of firm’s demand for specific human capital of top managers and the decrease of demand for general human capital.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.