Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments
Elections are among the most important and least understood institutions in contemporary authoritarian regimes. Theoretically, electoral authoritarian regimes should have an informational advantage that makes them more robust than other types of authoritarian regimes, but much empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this article we offer a new perspective on why this might be the case. Specifically, we consider how authoritarian elections influence a ruler’s choices in making cadre appointments. We argue that the imperative of winning authoritarian elections forces authoritarian leaders to prioritize the appointment of politically loyal cadres, who can help the regime win elections. This choice often comes at the expense of appointing officials who are competent at making good public policy and promoting economic development, factors that may contribute to long-term regime stability. We test this theory using an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments in one leading contemporary authoritarian regime, Russia.
The article is dedicated to analysis and comparison of arrangement and socio-political function of democratic and republican parties of the USA. The main stress is made on ideological vectors of both parties and also on the role of geographical position and interests of the USA population which influence forming of the political platforms of the parties. The main goal of the article is to demonstrate the growth of polarization of American society closely associated with the growth of parties' emphasis on target audience and differences in financial policy.
This work looks at a model of spatial election competition with two candidates who can spend effort in order to increase their popularity through advertisement. It is shown that under certain condition the political programs of the candidates will be different. The work derives the comparative statics of equilibrium policy platform and campaign spending with respect the distribution of voter policy preferences and the proportionality of the electoral system. In particular, it is whown that the equilibrium does not exist if the policy preferences are distributed over too narrow an interval.
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.
Game-theoretic model of election to a corporate board of directors is proposed. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution of seats is unique. The uniqueness guarantees nonmanipulability of elections. The distribution is obtained by the d’Hondt method of seats distribution in proportional representation problem. The model is tested on real data from a Russian company.
The textbook is made in accordance with the requirements for the results of the development of the undergraduate program, approved by the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation of December 1, 2016 No. 1511 of the FSES HPE in the area of training 40.03.01 Jurisprudence, the level of training is undergraduate. Co-hosts an introductory lecture on “Electoral law and the electoral process in the Russian Federation”, a lecture course, as well as the necessary materials, including tables, charts for the development of the training course "Electoral law and the electoral process", annexes - documents. Addressed to undergraduate and graduate students, undergraduates, teachers, practitioners in order to improve their skills. The team of authors of the textbook Electoral law and the electoral process are laureates of the regional stage (Moscow) of the 2018 All-Russian contest for the best work on electoral law and electoral process, improving the legal and political culture of voters (referendum participants), organizing elections to state bodies authorities, local governments in the Russian Federation and participants in election campaigns
In the article are : the social bases of power as a nation, the nation, the elite, the elemental forces of the political market. It is noted that the idealistic view on social grounds authorities do not correspond to modern realities. Long enough described expenses provisions on the management Board of the nation. It is proposed to consider the rationalist approach in the determination of the constitutions of the social bases of power. The examples of the constitutions of a number of foreign States, in which the provisions of popular sovereignty is not understood completely. Russia proposes changing approaches to understanding the essence of popular sovereignty and representative government.