Дифференциация заработных плат в России (1991–2008 гг.): факты и объяснения
This paper examines the evolution of overall wage inequality in Russia from the early 1990s to the present. We first document the stylized facts and show that inequality in labor earnings increased dramatically early in the transition period and then, albeit more moderately, after the 1998 financial crisis. The trend reversed in the early 2000s wage dispersion has been declining thereafter. Changes in wage inequality were largely driven by the lower end of the wage distribution. The paper reviews and provides a critical discussion of research on wage inequality and wage differentials in Russia and suggests areas where empirical research may provide new insight into the character and causes of recent changes in wage inequality. A common view is that the rise of returns to schooling to market levels and the reallocation of workers from the public sector to the private sector accounts for the bulk of increased wage inequality during transition. However, our analysis demonstrates that these factors explain a relatively small proportion of changes in the wage distribution. We find that wage differences across and within regions and industries do a better job of capturing the dynamics of wage inequality over last two decades. These patterns can be potentially explained by expanding the existing research to other areas including the effects of shocks, organizational changes, minimum wages, rent-sharing, incentive pay structures, wage bargaining regimes.
The paper documents the changes in the size of the wage distribution in Russia over the period 1994–2003. Developments in wage inequality varied a lot by sub-periods: overall wage inequality stayed stable in 1994–1996, then it jumped following the 1998 crisis and remained at higher levels for three years. In 2002 the trend reversed again and in the course of a single year wage inequality fell back to the level of the mid-1990s. We find that evolution wage inequality was largely driven by changes in the upper end of the wage distribution. Decomposition of wage inequality by population sub-groups shows that inequality has been higher for men, younger and low-educated workers, and rural inhabitants. The structure of inequality did not change much over the period from 1994 to 2003. Demographic variables (mainly gender and region) explain the largest proportion of wage dispersion (over 40% of the explained variation and 15% of total variation). Nearly equivalent is the contribution of firm characteristics with industry affiliation of employer playing the leading role. Our results show that returns to education continued to rise at all percentiles of the wage distribution converging at the level of about 8–9% of wage increase for an additional year of schooling.
Till 2008 remuneration system based on the unified tariff scale was officially implemented for the public sector of the Russian economy. New remuneration system (NRS) is intended to differentiate wages more clearly, bring it into compliance with output of labour input, eliminate the disproportion in the structure of employment, which are common for public sector. In this work was made an effort to estimate results of the remuneration reform with the example of medical institutions of three regions, which sequentially introduced NRS in 2008-2009. The estimates based on the Monitoring of healthcare economic problems microdata reveal the increase of wages and salaries within institutions that adopted NRS.
Attempts to explain the determinants and the dynamics of wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor have formed one of the most controversial topics in economics. The reason for such an intense interest in inequality in earnings between workers with different skill levels is the dramatic increase in wage inequality in the United States in the 1980s. However, the extent of wage differentials has substantially varied across countries over the recent decades. These different patterns across countries allow the factors contributing to wage inequality to be identified as a high priority research area. Skill-biased technical change is considered to be one of the factors contributing to wage inequality. This way of technical change favors highly skilled labor over less-skilled labor by increasing its relative demand and its earnings. This increase in the relative demand, as a rule, is caused by the appropriate increase in the relative productivity of more skilled workers. The other leading hypothesis that has emerged to explain the rapid changes in the wage inequality in the U.S. and some other countries over the recent decades is increased international trade between developed and developing countries. According to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade, countries endeavor to export goods that intensively use those resources they have in relative abundance. Thus, skill-abundant countries tend to be net exporters of those goods that intensively use skilled labor, while skill-scarce countries tend to be net exporters of those goods that intensively use unskilled labor. Furthermore, by virtue of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, it increases the skill premium in developed countries and reduces it in developing countries. Therefore, the impact of increasing international trade with developing counties on the skill premium and welfare of unskilled labor in developed countries has been at the centre of a heated debate. This paper analyzes trends in wage inequality and returns to education in a number of OECD and non-OECD countries over the recent decades. A theoretical model is developed to explain empirical observations. The paper examines the impact of skill-biased technological change and trade liberalization on wage inequality across different countries.
The paper documents changes in the structure of earnings and earnings inequality in Russia for the period 1994–2003 using the RLMS data. The period covers few years of the transformational recession (1994–1998), the financial crisis in 1998 and the first years of economic recovery (2000–2003). A regression-based decomposition reveals that within-group inequality plays the largest, yet diminishing, role. Among the explanatory variables, the largest proportion of earnings dispersion (75%–80% of the explained level of inequality) is explained by the geographical variables and job characteristics. The decomposition results suggest that the rise in inequality after the financial crisis of 1998 is likely to be a result of the differences in the adjustment speeds across regions and industries. Employer ownership is only marginally important; however, its effect has been steadily increasing for women due to the increase in the public-private sector wage gap. Contrary to the initial expectations, the wage inequality in the public sector was different from that in the private sector: both were of a similar level and followed similar patterns of changes.
The concept of “Chinese Miracle” comprises two dimensions. The first one is obvious and purely economic in nature: 9 percent annual GDP growth rate over quarter of a century. The second one is less obvious, but no less important and is institutional: the ruling Leninist one-party state not only survived apparently successful transition to the market economy, but even consolidated its institutional grip in the wake of this transition. This fact looks indeed extraordinary and even paradoxical in the light of the catastrophic fate of all other communist party-states in the former USSR and its East- Central European satellites, which—in different times and to different degrees - also initiated market reforms. The explanation of this paradox lies in the specific constellation of social, demographic and historic factors in China. The practical embodiment of this constellation was the unparalleled price reform, carried out in the 1980-90s. This reform transformed decentralized directive pricing, which existed between the 1950s and the 1980s, into a system of agreed pricing. However, party-state institutions remained the key players in defining the conditions of pricing agreements. Their positions of the biggest financial monopolist, lender of last resort as well as that of the sole macroeconomic controller also remained basically intact. The potential of the Chinese party-state to exhibit institutional resilience in the process of “market transition” turned out to be unexpectedly significant. However, the basic limitation of such resilience is that the principle of soft-budget constraint still dominates the behavior of key economic and administrative players, constantly invoking the specter of macroeconomic chaos with unpredictable institutional consequences.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.