Саморегулируемые организации финансового рынка и их влияние на качество институционального устройства экономики США
The paper studies collective preferences of the financial self-regulatory organizations (SRO) with regard to financial market inefficiency. A model of financial industry professionals' combined utility dependence on their collective preferences parameters was analyzed. It was determined that it is unreasonable to allocate enforcement regulatory powers to SROs, because proper SRO enforcement contradicts to the commercial interests of its members. But, simultaneously, the commercial interests of the industry professionals are aligned with SRO rulemaking interests. SRO can be a highly efficient institute in regulatory rules and financial market infrastructure design. It is also shown that the proposed parameters of the US SROs' activity are closely related to the World Bank US governance indicators. It was determined that these parameters are institutional in their nature and can serve as indicators of the financial market regulatory system quality.