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Трансформации режимов правительности под влиянием новых областей знания: случай поведенческой экономики
This article analyzes the consequences of the growing popularity of behavioral economics in the field of governance after the 2008 financial crisis. The main result of behavioral research, which originated in the 1970s at the junction of psychology and economics, was the rejection of traditional for economic theory views on human nature due to the discovery of irrational decision-making mechanisms. First behavioral economists have demonstrated the inconsistency of the “homo economicus” normative model with empirical realities. The revision of the rational choice theory, in turn, has accelerated the process of developing new public policy instruments, which have a greater effect on unconscious psychological triggers, rather than appeal to the rationality of the governed. The most famous example is the «nudge theory» by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, which suggests a specific way of transforming the “mistakes” of human thinking into the optimal result for society and the individual. Appeal to the cognitive sciences, including behavioral economics, neuroscience and research in the field of artificial intelligence, has become one of the main trends in modern public administration. Supporters of such a “psychological” approach to governance see it as a way to achieve universal welfare in an era when archaic centralized regulation ceases to cope with new challenges, while at the same time preserving the freedom of choice. Opponents emphasize that the rejection of the rational subject model carries with it serious political risks, since it opens up unlimited opportunities for state intervention. Using Michel Foucault's analytics of governmentality, we show that the transition from the “homo economicus” model to the imperfect “psychological subject” model in the practices of economic regulation weakens the need for management through individual freedom, which was a defining feature of the neoliberal governmentality. This creates the prerequisites for the formation and strengthening of new regimes of power that can achieve market efficiency in spite of, and not because of, the values of political liberalism.