Repeated bidding games were introduced by De Meyer and Saley (2002) to analyze the evolution of the price system at finance markets with asymmetric information. In the paper of De Meyer and Saley arbitrary bids are allowed. It is more realistic to assume that players may assign only discrete bids proportional to a minimal currency unit. This paper represents a survey of author's results on discrete bidding games with asymmetric information.
We describe optimal contest success functions (CSF) which maximize expected revenues of an administrator who allocates under informational asymmetry a source of rent among competing bidders. It is shown that in the case of independent private values rent administrator’s optimal mechanism can always be implemented via some CSFs as posited by Tullock. Optimal endogenous CSFs have properties which are often assumed a priori as plausible features of rent-seeking contests; the paper therefore validates such assumptions for a broad class of contests. Various extensions or optimal CSFs are analyzed.
This study investigates the puzzle of zero-debt in emerging markets using a sample of firms from Eastern Europe during 2000-2013. The results of this paper are in line with the previous research of firms from developed markets. Firms that are financially constrained do not use debt as a result of credit rationing while financially unconstrained firms intentionally eschew debt to maintain financial flexibility and avoid underinvestment incentives. Furthermore, this study provides new insights into unconstrained firms’ performance during different economic situations. Firms that strategically avoid debt show better financial results than levered firms.
Being one item by definition investment is actually not homogenous: generally, there are two major types – capital investment and investment in M&A deals. They are different from firm’s point of view and influence economic growth through different channels. In this paper, we examine the relationship between new capital investments and investments in acquisitions in Russia using data for more than one hundred companies in 2004-2014. The period is split into two sub-samples – period of rapid growth (before the global financial crisis of 2008) and post-crisis one (after 2009). Our results show that relationship between fixed investments and investments in acquisitions is opposite for two periods. In the first period, relationship between two types of investment was positive for non-state companies and insignificant for state ones that possibly means that companies did not face the choice of investment form. After the global financial crisis, when monetary conditions and access to external capital markets for Russia tightened considerably, the relationship between investment in new capital and investment in acquisitions became negative. It proves that companies faced a trade-off between two investment forms. Moreover, acquisitions became dependent on company’s profitability. Therefore, the trade-off can be more severe in developing economies since they are more dependent on external financing. These results can provide policy implications given the new understanding of financial constraint significance for investment.
This paper analyzes international high-skilled migration caused by financial frictions in educational market. I develop a model of learning in which acquisition of skill is only possible through personal interaction with a skilled individual; the income of the skilled is sensitive to financial constraints for the unskilled. Cross-country differences in such constraints have a multiplicative effect on the skill premium, causing outmigration of skilled individuals from a less developed country. I study welfare implications of such brain drain for the sending and receiving countries. Although it makes more difficult skill acquisition in the sending country, the unskilled may still be better off: increased cost of skill acquisition is offset by higher income once the skill has been acquired. For the receiving country, I identify a phenomenon of immiserizing immigration: a depletion of the stock of skill in the sending country due to brain drain hinders further production of skill, which may hurt the receiving country. Additionally, I find that increased openness of the sending country to migration and the resultant accelerated brain drain increase the incentives of the country government to reduce financial frictions.
After the global financial crisis Russian macroeconomic dynamics changed dramatically: reduced access to external financing and the worsening economic outlook led to very weak investment dynamics. We test and confirm the hypothesis that one of the reasons is high debt burden of Russian companies - debt overhang. We propose a new indicator for debt overhang. Now the issue of financing investment in Russia is especially important: due to political reasons, the international capital markets are closed for most Russian companies. Special attention is given to the active participation of the government in the capital of companies. Companies associated with the state have formal and informal preferences, easier access to debt financing and may have soft budget constraints.
We consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are random integer variables that are determined by the initial chance move according to a probability distribution p over the two-dimensional integer lattice that is known to both players. Player 1 is informed on the prices of both types of shares, but Player 2 is not. The bids may take any integer value.
The model of n-stage bidding is reduced to a zero-sum repeated game with lack of information on one side. We show that, if liquidation prices of shares have finite variances, then the sequence of values of n-step games is bounded. This makes it reasonable to consider the bidding of unlimited duration that is reduced to the infinite game G1(p). We offer the solutions for these games.
We begin with constructing solutions for these games with distributions p having two and three-point supports. Next, we build the optimal strategies of Player 1 for bidding games G1(p) with arbitrary distributions p as convex combinations of his optimal strategies for such games with distributions having two- and three-point supports. To do this we construct the symmetric representation of probability distributions with fixed integer expectation vectors as a convex combination of distributions with not more than three-point supports and with the same expectation vectors.