Дэвидсон об истине, нормах и диспозициях
Normative dualism between descriptions of the mental and the physical is still a problem for many philosophers that provokes more and more attempts to justify it, or, on the contrary, to overcome it by means of reduction. The problem of a special normative status of mental states is usually considered in isolation from the concept of truth. Moreover, the definition of truth is often construed only as a part of the problem of normativity: in this case, truth is only a kind of norm, for example, a goal of scientific research. Donald Davidson, however, believed that truth is not the norm and that, on the contrary, norms are possible only through the use of the primitive and original concept of truth already available to us. In this paper, we propose that if one develops an idea of such a conceptual dependence between truth and norms in a certain way, then it will become possible to solve the problem of a normative gap between our descriptions of the mental and the physical. In other words, if the assimilation of the concept of truth precedes the learning of norms pertaining to the mental and the physical, then the solution for the problem of the gap between these norms can be directly related to conditions and differences in the use of the notion of truth.
The metasemantic version of two-dimensionalism developed by R. Stalnaker is considered in the connection with the opposition "logic as calculus" vs. "logic as uversal medium". Some philosophical and methodological advantages of such approach are pointed out.
While the traditional philosophical epistemology stresses the importance of distinguishing knowledge from true beliefs, the formalisation of this distinction with standard logical means turns out to be problematic. In Knowledge Representation (KR) as a Computer Science discipline this crucial distinction is largely neglected. A practical consequence of this neglect is that the existing KR systems store and communicate knowledge that cannot be verified and justified by users of these systems without external means. Information obtained from such systems does not qualify as knowledge in the sense of philosophical epistemology.
Recent advances in the research area at the crossroad of the computational mathematical logic, formal epistemology and computer science open new perspectives for an effective computational realisation of justificatory procedures in KR. After exposing the problem of justification in logic, epistemology and KR, we sketch a novel framework for representing knowledge along with relevant justificatory procedures, which is based on the Homotopy Type theory (HoTT). This formal framework supports representation of both propositional knowledge, aka knowledge-that, and non-propositional knowledge, aka knowledge-how or procedural knowledge. The default proof-theoretic semantics of HoTT allows for combining the two sorts of represented knowledge at the formal level by interpreting all permissible constructions as justification terms (witnesses) of associated propositions.
The article examines Husserl project of the renovation of European cultural mankind in context of the genesis of Husserl’s practical philosophy, existential motivations for the emergence of the idea of renovation (Erneuerung) and in perspective of its adaptations to the contemporary. The key point of the article – Husserl’s thesis about internationalization through the phenomenological "spirit of autonomy". Аnalyzing of the problem of harmonization between universal theoretical and concrete practical dimension of the idea of renovation, author explicate the socio-critical and cultural creative potential of Husserl's phenomenology.
This comment on a paper by C. Bessy and O. Favereau (“Institutions and economic theory of conventions”) discusses an interdisciplinary character of the theory of conventions and a potential fruitfulness of a dialogue between social sciences. In light of this dialogue, are reviewed some particularities of the conventionalist use of a notion of “institution”, as well as the interpretation given by Bessy and Favereau to a relation between “institution” and “convention”. Finally, a question is formulated concerning the consequences of the conventionalist analysis of institutions for social ontology and methodology of economic sciences.
The phenomenon of communication as a manifestation of complexity of interacting creatures. Communication is considered not as a privilege of a human being; it is shown that it is rooted in the world of living nature, it has an evolutionary origins. Communicative complexity is exposed by such concepts as flexibility, constructing, intersubjectivity, participatory sense-making, empathy, synergy, mutual incorporation and co-emergence of creatures which enter the process of communication. Understanding of communication from the position of the conception of enactivism allows disclosing some substantial aspects of the constructivist character of communicative interaction.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.