### Article

## Games with symmetric incomplete information and asymmetric computational resources

We consider random public signals on the state of two-person zero-sum game with incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game). To learn the state, each player chooses a finite automaton which receives the public signal; the player only sees the output of the automaton chosen. Supposing that the size of automata available to Player 1 is essentially bigger than that available to Player 2, we give an example of public signal with random length of output strings where the posterior belief of Player 1 is the state and the posterior belief of Player 2 is close to his original belief. Thus, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players.Besides, for a class of random signals with fixed length of output strings, we estimate the fraction of signals such that some automaton of given size may help Player 2 to significantly reestimate prior probability of the state. We show that this fraction is negligible if the size of automata of Player 2 is sufficiently smaller than length of output strings.