Трансцендентализм и архи-ископаемое: возможна ли феноменология «не-данного»?
The article considers the problem of the arche-fossil, a crucial element of Q. Meillassoux’s critique of transcendental philosophy as a kind of “correlationism”, within his speculative materialist project. The reconstruction of his position as anti-transcendentalism based on principle of factuality and contingency is provided. Meillassoux’s project is compared with one of recent versions of naturalism concordant with the former in the questions concerning contingency and natural-historical dependence between reason and nature. Then the project of “epigenetic rationality” by C. Malabou is discussed as an attempt to revive transcendentalism opposed to speculative philosophy of Meillassoux. The transcendental can be retained with the concept of epigenesis, introduced in §27 of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” and applied to the teleology of the living. This discloses the contingency of reason without relinquishing the permanency of the transcendental architectonics. The conceptualization of the arche-fossil is possible within the context of phenomenology, and is realized in an outline of phenomenology of the “non-given” in a series of procedures of reducing of the non-given to the given. Thematization of the question of the arche-fossil presupposes revision of basic implications of phenomenology. The discussion with Meillassoux’s speculative materialism which made explicit the problem of the interrelation between the transcendental and the contingent allows to make an outline of speculative foundations of phenomenology. With the support of works by A. Schnell and I.H. Grant it is shown that phenomenology pretending to be the “first philosophy” needs speculative foundations as transcendental philosophy.