At være ortodoks i det moderne Rusland
The article discusses developments of Orthodox Chriasianity in post-Soviet Russia.
The capter is dedicated to the description of the fragmentation of the Russian media-based public sphere, in particular - to the dymanics of media use of the participants of the 'For fair elections' political protest movement in Russia of 2011-2012. Authors counclude that: 1) socio-economic divisions in today's Russia are mirrored in the media use patterns; 2) traditional textocentricism of Russian intelligentsia shows up and shapes media preferences and opinion leading: 3) changes in political behavior online (weakly) correlates with differences in online media use patterns; 4) a nation-wide public counter-sphere has formed in the Russian big cities. A prediction is made that fragmentation of the Russian public sphere will be deepening.
The book reveals the interconnection between social, cultural and political protest movements and social and economic changes in a post-communist country like Russia still dominated by bureaucratic rulers and "oligarchs" controlling all basic industries and mining activities. Those interests are also dominating Russia’s foreign policy and explain why Russia did not succeed in becoming an integral part of Europe. The latter is, at least, wished by many Russian citizens.
This article revisits the evolution of intergenerational social mobility in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. In particular, it looks at historical changes in the residential, educational and occupational mobility of Russians. The study contributes to the literature by extending the spectrum of institutional and historical contexts, in which the (in)equality of opportunity has been considered so far, re-examining existing evidence by using alternative datasets and a different methodology.
For an empirical investigation I utilize data from four representative cross-national surveys conducted in Russia in 1994, 2002, 2006 and 2013. Following the theoretical arguments developed in the comparative social mobility research and being informed by their empirical findings, I anticipated (1) a trend towards lesser openness in the late years of the Soviet era; (2) a temporary discontinuity of mobility patterns during the turbulent 1990s; and (3) the stagnation of social mobility in the more stable years of Russia’s post-Soviet history. However, my findings reveal no unambiguous trends suggested by previous research, moreover they contradict some of the earlier evidence. In particular, I found (1) steadily decreasing residential mobility both in absolute and relative terms (implying increasing closure of residential communities); (2) a weakening link between parental and child educational attainment in the post-Soviet era; and (3) the invariance of social fluidity in terms of occupational attainment both in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The paper concludes by highlighting some of the remaining questions and possible directions for future research.
Published here is the second part of the article. It begins with discussion of loglinear modeling, a technique which is used to analyze mobility tables and to explore the patterns of relative social mobility. In the rest of the article I discuss the empirical findings with regard to the three dimensions of social mobility outlined above. Finally I draw the conclusions, which generalize findings from both parts of the article.
The chapter focuses on one of the ways to communicate with the sacred popular among contemporary Russian Orthodox believers – written appealing to the saints (letters and notes). Although not happy at all about this habit, the Church managers allow to publish these letters in the parish newspapers and web-sites and in other church mass-media. Analysis of publications of the letters addressed to Saint Xenia of Petersburg proves that the Church publishes them as a part of its advertising campaign targeted on those people who prefer irregular religiosity (pilgrimages, letters to the saint, etc) to traditional regular parish life. The chapter develops Peter Berger’s metaphor of religious market.
This paper analyzes contemporary Russian family policy, focusing on the state’s ideological orientation and the political measures it has taken with regard to the family as a social institution. Documents representing official and normative discourse of family policy in contemporary Russia serve here as data for the study. The paper identifies stages of the formation and realization of Russian family policy. Analysis of these stages shows that, neither at the level of ideology nor in terms of specific tools of implementation, is this policy coherent. A pronatalist strategy ensures that many real problems faced by families stay on the periphery of family policy. This paper maintains that Russian family policy should take into account the diversity of modern forms of family relationships and increase societal support for citizens with family responsibilities, not limited to only family financial support.
The chapter analyses veneration of St Xenia of St Petersburg who is very popular among different groups of contemporary believers in the Russian Orthodox Church. The authors aim to answer why this particular saint became so popular. To answer the question they analyze various types of texts which represent the saint to the believers, including her hagiography and hymnology, on the one hand, and popular literature about her, on the other. The data also includes the ethnographic research of the practices of veneration. The authors argue that popularity of the saint can be (partly) explained by the fact that she is represented by the church and perceived by the believers as a role model for the contemporary believers. She is a saint of irregular believers, and the dynamic channel for Church newcomers.
New political, social and cultural reality in the first five years since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The current crisis between the EU and Russia is influenced by much more serious factors than political tensions over Ukraine or the US political agenda. We suppose that to some extent it has represented a consequence of the crisis of national identity in Russia during the post-Soviet period. And the ongoing crisis clearly reflects that unclear social, political and national identities allow some stakeholders to substitute an objective stimulus for sustainable cooperation with cultural and economic partners that have been historically close, i.e., Russia and European countries, by negative propaganda. The current perception of Europe and Europeans, which is widely shared by the majority of the Russian population, has switched from a thousand years of joint history, development and cultural enrichment to ‘irreconcilable divergences’. This dramatic process develops both in the EU and Russia nowadays but in this paper we focus on the challenge to Russian identity, its roots and modern aspects. The analysis we provide within this paper demonstrates some fundamental preconditions of the political crisis between the EU and Russia that started in 2014, related to identity challenge rather than to international relations per se or value conflict. The concluding part of this paper is dedicated to a search for new approaches to identity policy that might be implemented in Russia and would positively influence a political dialogue between Europe and Russia by making it more predictable.
A joint research project carried out by an interdisciplinary group of Russian and Swedish linguists, sociologists and educators-psychologists (the Swedish Institute grant), besides solving pragmatic tasks of finding out relative quantitative-qualitative specificity of national cognitive representations of values, first of all, had methodological goals. They were to check the efficiency of the linguistic methods developed in this study (and, thus, to prove the theoretical ideas that served the basis for it) of getting factual data that allow reconstructing and comparing of the corresponding areas of cognitive representations.
The results of cross-cultural research of implicit theories of innovativeness among students and teachers, representatives of three ethnocultural groups: Russians, the people of the North Caucasus (Chechens and Ingushs) and Tuvinians (N=804) are presented. Intergroup differences in implicit theories of innovativeness are revealed: the ‘individual’ theories of innovativeness prevail among Russians and among the students, the ‘social’ theories of innovativeness are more expressed among respondents from the North Caucasus, Tuva and among the teachers. Using the structural equations modeling the universal model of values impact on implicit theories of innovativeness and attitudes towards innovations is constructed. Values of the Openness to changes and individual theories of innovativeness promote the positive relation to innovations. Results of research have shown that implicit theories of innovativeness differ in different cultures, and values make different impact on the attitudes towards innovations and innovative experience in different cultures.