Вып. 1. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2009.
Added: Oct 27, 2012
Иванов Э. А. В кн.: Международное экономическое право в эпоху глобализации. Liber amicorum в честь 60-летия профессора В.М. Шумилова: сборник статей. Вып. 54. М.: ВАВТ, 2014. С. 58-68.
The author analize implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 1977 in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Special attention paid to the influence of the Convention on the development of anti-corruption compliance control in companies, to the liability for corruption offenses and application of the UK and the US anti-corruption law to foreign companies.
Added: Oct 17, 2014
Bashina Aleksandra. International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies. 2013. Vol. 6. No. 4.
P. 403-430.
It is known that anticorruption measures do not significantly reduce the corruption of state employees in Russia. The goal of this research is to analyse factors that influence the level of bribery in public procurement. The investigation is based on data from two surveys. The first was conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The second is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. We use binary response, ordered logit models and probit models with sample selection in this paper. Our econometric study demonstrates that incentives to bribe are higher in sectors with strong competition. Holding company members and the companies owned by the state are less involved in bribery than are private firms. The probability of bribery increases if unpredictable government regulation and political instability heavily influence enterprise performance.
Added: Oct 24, 2013
Новичков Н. В. Вестник Московского государственного университета культуры и искусств. 2011. № 4. С. 22-30.
This article is talking about state management and cultural policy, their nature and content in term of the new tendency - development of postindustrial society. It mentioned here, that at the moment cultural policy is the base of regional political activity and that regions can get strong competitive advantage if they are able to implement cultural policy successfully. All these trends can produce elements of new economic development.
Added: Sep 13, 2012
Рассадовская А. В. Современная экономика: проблемы и решения. 2015. Т. 8. С. 56-68.
Purpose: communication in queues with priorities as a factor of changes in bids. Discussion: in models of waiting lines imperfect information is common, but redistributing available information betweeen agents if often ignored. Meanwhile in real life people or firms can reveal hidden characteristics of their neighbors by communicating to them. Results: estimation the value of bribe taking into account expected bribes of other agents is considered. Communication that enables to get to know relevant information is suggested. We show cases in which it reduces the amount of bribes.
Added: Jan 12, 2016
Popov S. V. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2013. Vol. Forthcoming.
I propose a bribery model in which bureaucratic decisionmaking is decentralized. I establish that bribe extortion is economically nonneutral, and that capital markets in corrupt economies exhibit higher returns. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy's productivity due to suppression of small businesses. Competition among bureaucrats might improve the outcome, but does not necessarily decrease the total graft. The choice of corruption fighting tactics and the choice of whom to blame provide nontrivial outcomes.
Added: Dec 4, 2013
Вып. 1. М.: Некоммерческая исследовательская служба «Среда», 2011.
Added: Feb 7, 2013
Aistov A.,
Mukhametova Elvina. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2015. No. WP BRP 89/EC/2015.
In this paper we explore relationships between corruption perceptions and such characteristics as the size of shadow economy, GDP per capita, well-being, the Happy Planet Index (HPI), and quality of institutions. Special attention is paid to the comparison of transitional economies with countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007, and developed countries. It is shown that irrespective of whether the economy is developed or transitional, negative dependence of corruption perceptions on shadow economy switches to positive if the size of the shadow economy increases over 15% of the official GDP. After the shadow economy passes 45%, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ceases to respond to growth of the shadow economy. Our estimates confirm that transition in countries is accompanied by growth of GDP per capita and a decrease in the level of corruption perceptions. For these reasons, transitional countries and countries where transition is over belongs to different clusters according to these indicators. This is not true for well-being and the HPI. It is not surprising that a regression analysis shows that "control of corruption" and "regulatory quality" are significant for reducing corruption perceptions both in transitional and other economies. It is interesting that "government effectiveness" and "voice and accountability" are significant only for transitional economies and insignificant in others. "Rule of law" and "political stability" are insignificant both in transitional and in developed countries
Added: Feb 17, 2015
Марьясис Д. А. В кн.: Мировой опыт борьбы с коррупцией. М.: ООО "Лингвистика", 2014. С. 90-107.
Added: Feb 17, 2015
Corruption, i.e. regular abuse of public office for private gains, draws substantial attention of
researchers in many disciplines. Our paper adds to the experimental literature on corruption a novel
experiment on corruption-at-the-top among the real Russian police officers of senior middle rank as
experimental subjects (apparently the first study of that kind), which is contrasted to that of ordinary
citizens (students in economics). Our experimental design explicitly takes account of the peculiarities
of the Russian case during police reform, as well as social and institutional constraints facing anticorruption
policies. We find that taking bribes, and especially defending against possible checks
of corruption, is quite common to Russian police officers, yet even more typical is their readiness
to contribute towards the decrease of the likelihood of this anti-corruption check, even if this
contribution leads to private losses. Another typical feature is increased volatility of the frequency
and scale of bribery among the police officers (as contrasted to ordinary citizens) when measures
aimed at fighting corruption are introduced. We discuss robustness of these findings, as well as their
implications for anti-corruption policy.
Added: Jun 7, 2015
Nisnevich Y. A. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2016. No. 2728822.
This paper focuses on the link between the modern authoritarianism and corruption. Even though corruption plays an important role in Communist regimes, post-colonial dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies, coercion - which is a traditional tool used by authoritarian rulers - remains the basis of these regimes. However, a new type of non-democratic regimes, which we call neoauthoritarian, has emerged since the last quarter of the XX century. The new regimes are based on a dynamic interplay between coercion and corruption. That interplay allows authoritarian rulers to bring to the forefront either coercion or corruption, depending on the current political situation in the country and the political, economic and social issues on the political agenda. In this type of regimes, ruling political-economic groups capture the state and the public authority in the country and use all their instruments and resources to achieve their private goals. This paper presents empirical results showing that the Communist regimes, dictatorships and authoritarian monarchies exist in 33 modern non-democratic states, while neoauthoritarian regimes can be found in 19 states. I show that high levels of corruption are typical of all of these regimes, especially in dictatorships and neoauthoritarian ones. I explain a relatively lower level of corruption in the authoritarian monarchies using Olson's theory of stationary bandit. In particular, I speculate that the ruling monarchs fight corruption among bureaucrats since they perceive it as stealing their own property that damages the sources of their administrative rent and their revenues. At the same time, the high-level political corruption persists. Finally, I show that dictatorships are on average more fragile than economically elastic neoauthoritarian regimes, although it might be challenging to differentiate between them. All authoritarian and neoauthoritarian regimes, except a few monarchies, are non-stable regimes, allowing me to hypothesize their coming transformations or collapse.
Added: Feb 9, 2016
Vol. 5. Iss. 1. EDIS - Publishing Institution of the University of Zilina, 2016.
Added: Nov 25, 2016
Воробьев А. Н. В кн.: Проблемы политического и государственного управления в России и зарубежных странах. М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2011.
С. 60-87.
Added: Dec 6, 2016
М.: Российский экономический университет имени Г.В. Плеханова, 2011.
Added: Dec 14, 2012
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.
Added: Nov 17, 2014
Рощин С. Ю. Проблемы рынка труда. WP3. Высшая школа экономики, 2003. № 02.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Aistov A. Education. EDU. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 5.
This research focuses on estimating the signalling role of education on the Russian labour market. Two well-known screening hypotheses are initially considered. According to first of these, education is an ideal filter of persons with low productivity: education does not increase the productivity of a person, but it does give him the possibility to signal about his innate productivity via an educational certicate. The second of these hypotheses admits that productivity actually does increase during the period of study, but nevertheless the main objective of getting an education is to acquire a signal about one's productivity. Information theory suggests that employees use education signals during the hiring processes whereby employers screen potential employees. Employers and other categories of self-employed workers are usually not screened by the labour market via their educational attainments. Comparison of the returns to education of employees vs. self-employed workers could show the difference between the returns to signals and the returns to human capital. Yet another way to understand the signals is to consider the time dynamics of the returns to education for employees staying in the same firm. This helps us to answer the question about whether the signals are valuable only during the hiring process, or whether they remain valuable during the whole experience with the firm. This research is based on the Mincerian-type earnings functions, estimated on RLMS-HSE and NOBUS data. On the basis of the available information, we cannot say that the returns to signals and human capital differ significantly in Russia. Nevertheless we can say that, for the majority of men, the return to educational signals decreases with time spent in the same firm, while we observe the opposite for women.
Added: May 15, 2012
Черных А. И. Политическая теория и политический анализ. WP14. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. № 03.
Added: May 3, 2012
Мукомель В. И. Демоскоп Weekly. 2011. № 479-480.
Added: Sep 10, 2013
Яковлев А. А. Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 4.
С. 21-37.
Added: Sep 22, 2012
Edited by: А. Михайлов Вып. 14. М.: Социологический факультет МГУ, 2012.
Added: Mar 14, 2013
Аистов А. В.,
Леонова Л. А. ÐаÑÑнÑе Ð´Ð¾ÐºÐ»Ð°Ð´Ñ Ð»Ð°Ð±Ð¾ÑаÑоÑии колиÑеÑÑвенного анализа и моделиÑÐ¾Ð²Ð°Ð½Ð¸Ñ Ñкономики. P1. ÐижегоÑодÑкий Ñилиал ÐÐУ ÐШÐ, 2010. â Р1/2010/04.
Added: May 21, 2012