Values and Corruption: Do Postmaterialists Justify Bribery?
Using World Values Survey data from several dozen countries around the world, this article analyzes the relationship between postmaterialist values and bribery (dis)approval in a multilevel framework. We find that people, who place stronger emphasis on postmaterialist values, tend to justify bribery more. However, the “ecological” effect of postmaterialism operates in the exactly opposite direction: A higher prevalence of postmaterialist values induces more bribery disapproval, and especially among postmaterialists themselves. In our view, this happens because the large number of people who internalized postmaterialist values generate positive social externalities which strengthen negative attitudes toward corruption. We outline a theoretical framework that explains why and how these externalities may emerge. Our results contribute to the literature on the sociocultural factors of corruption, provide a better understanding of the complex nature of postmaterialism, and also might be interesting in the light of ongoing discussions on whether moral attitudes are culturally universal or culturally specific.
The author analize implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 1977 in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Special attention paid to the influence of the Convention on the development of anti-corruption compliance control in companies, to the liability for corruption offenses and application of the UK and the US anti-corruption law to foreign companies.
It is known that anticorruption measures do not significantly reduce the corruption of state employees in Russia. The goal of this research is to analyse factors that influence the level of bribery in public procurement. The investigation is based on data from two surveys. The first was conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The second is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. We use binary response, ordered logit models and probit models with sample selection in this paper. Our econometric study demonstrates that incentives to bribe are higher in sectors with strong competition. Holding company members and the companies owned by the state are less involved in bribery than are private firms. The probability of bribery increases if unpredictable government regulation and political instability heavily influence enterprise performance.
This article is talking about state management and cultural policy, their nature and content in term of the new tendency - development of postindustrial society. It mentioned here, that at the moment cultural policy is the base of regional political activity and that regions can get strong competitive advantage if they are able to implement cultural policy successfully. All these trends can produce elements of new economic development.
Purpose: communication in queues with priorities as a factor of changes in bids. Discussion: in models of waiting lines imperfect information is common, but redistributing available information betweeen agents if often ignored. Meanwhile in real life people or firms can reveal hidden characteristics of their neighbors by communicating to them. Results: estimation the value of bribe taking into account expected bribes of other agents is considered. Communication that enables to get to know relevant information is suggested. We show cases in which it reduces the amount of bribes.
I propose a bribery model in which bureaucratic decisionmaking is decentralized. I establish that bribe extortion is economically nonneutral, and that capital markets in corrupt economies exhibit higher returns. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy's productivity due to suppression of small businesses. Competition among bureaucrats might improve the outcome, but does not necessarily decrease the total graft. The choice of corruption fighting tactics and the choice of whom to blame provide nontrivial outcomes.
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.