Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996–2002
Using panel data on large Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate
control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change during the period 1996-
2002. We find that privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth and
that, in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Interestingly,
we find that being privatised has a positive impact on employment growth but that this impact is
concentrated within a range of three to six years after privatisation. In contrast with the findings of
earlier literature, we find evidence that there are no systematic differences in employment response
to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. On the other hand, employment in state
firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these combined results we infer that the
behaviour of state firms is constrained by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints.
Consistent with this, we find that privatised companies, three to six years post-privatisation, are the
firms for whom employment is most responsive to positive sales growth and as such, offer the best
hope for rapid labour market expansion.
Despite over 30 years of worldwide reforms in many directions to increase efficiency, public transport markets present a variety of arrangements regarding operations, control and ownership that are amenable to improvement. This workshop will examine the contextual economic, political, cultural and social factors behind these many different cases that can be observed around the world. Through a better understanding of such factors it will examine the competition and ownership options for regulated public transport markets, taking full account of local contextual factors. This will include examination of methods for improving performance without major competition and ownership changes, for example by improved institutional design (both top-down and bottom-up), the development of trusting partnerships, the promotion of negotiated contracts and the introduction of optimal operating rules.
The Working Paper examines the peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. We distinguish between banks that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
Few economic events have caused such controversy as the privatization process in Russia. Some see it as the foundation of political and economic freedom. For others it was economics gone wrong, and ended in "Russians stealing money from their own country". As Russia reasserts itself, and its new brand of capitalism, it is ever more important that policy makers and scholars understand the roots of the economic structure and governance of that country; what was decided, who made the decisions and why, what actually transpired, and what implications this has for the future of Russia.
This work, written by two senior advisors to the Russian government, has unique access to documentation, tracking the decision making process in the Russian Mass Privatization process. By close reference to events, and supplemented by interviews with many of the key participants, it shows that the policies adopted were often influenced and shaped by different forces than those cited by current popular accounts. The book challenges the interpretation of Russian privatization by some of the West’s most eminent economists. It underlines that economists of all schools, who bring assumptions from the West to the analysis of Russia, may reach false or misleading conclusions. It is an essential guide for anyone interested in Russian economic reform, and anyone who seeks to understand this enigmatic country, and its actions today.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
In this study, for the first time in Russian practice from a large amount of empirical data on state contracts for procurement of goods, works and services, made a major budgetary organization during 2008-2010., Examines factors affecting the decline in trading, delays in supplies, as well as problems in the performance of obligations under the contracts. The analysis showed that a reduction prices at the auctions directly dependent on the number of applications accepted for review by the competitive commissions. Falling prices are more frequent in the procurement of goods and experimental trust (compared to the benefits of the inspection), as well as a state contract for works. However, the prices are much less likely to have been lowered in auctions (compared to purchasing through quotations and tenders). Delays in supplies occurred in 27% of patients and were more frequent in the procurement of experimental benefits, and were characterized for major purchases and state contracts executed during the I-III quarters of the year. More serious problems in the performance of obligations, full fraught with supply disruptions, have characterized the state contracts, culminating in the IV quarter. The overall risk supply disruptions were reported only 5% of purchases at competitive procedures, but on the contracts accounted for nearly half of all purchases of the budget organization in 2008-2010. Based on the analysis in the formulation of recommendations to improve the system of public procurement.
Researchers of the Russian economy have unanimously identified the most important features of stock ownership and control (NССG 2008: 12-16). First, the concentration of capital in the corporate sector resulting from its aggressive redistribution for more than 15 years tends to be high. Secondly, the high concentration of ownership affected the development of corporate control and evolution of the mechanisms of corporate governance. This high concentration provides the basis for control by the majority shareholder or a consolidated group of such shareholders exercised by various formal and informal means. Majority shareholders are constrained only by the need to comply with the formal legal provisions and often imitate the activities of intra-corporate tools.
The idea of ligalization of bribe giving for certain types of bribes was expressed by K. Basu in 2011 and got a name Basu proposal. In this paper we discuss effects that can be caused by the direct implementation of this proposal. Our game-theoretic model shows that while legalisation of certain bribe-giving occurances can lead to some positive consequences, it is not always a good idea to return bribe to the bribe-giver as suggested by Basu. The chance to get the paid bribe back increases the amount of bribes that end up in corrupt officials' pockets.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.