Идея пререфлексивного самосознания: альтернатива классической модели трансцендирования или ее модификация?
The idea of pre-reflective consciousness arises in response to difficulties that occur in the process of searching for the foundation of the unity of our conscious experience. The basis of the experience can not be found in the experience and lies beyond the world of objects. Can we distinguish a single classical way of transcendence? If so, what is the way and what are its fundamental difficulties? Can the idea of pre-reflective consciousness be considered as the basis of another method of transcendence?
The author argues that the classical method of transcendence of the experience bases on temporality and substantiality – the structures that are found by the way of reflection. As necessary for any experience, these characteristics are projected to a source of experience and understood as characteristics of subjectivity.
Sartre indicates that self-consciousness is enclosed in the awareness of transcendent object. It is so-called pre-reflective self-consciousness. However, Sartre’s ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness is reflective self-consciousness. Indeed the conscious as such is neither any object nor a collection of objects. The consciousness itself is Nothing – that is Sartre’s modification of substance. Time is the condition of possibility of the consciousness.
Reflexive transcendence always turns out to be unjustified, since it is based only on positing of the immediate characteristics of subjectivity.
What is another way of transcendence? The consciousness should be presented not as a kind of an immediate givenness, but rather as the result of self-knowledge. A certain ‘givenness’ of subjectivity is the condition of possibility of the consciousness, however, this ‘givenness’ cannot be conscious, i.e. available for reflection. We can only talk about the pre-reflective pre-conscious ‘givenness’ of self, but this ‘givenness’ is not something initially and directly accessible, but a result of pre-conscious cognition. Therefore the object of self-knowledge can not be initially identical to the subject of self-knowledge.