Онтологический аргумент Стивена Мэйкина: понятие, обеспечивающее необходимое существование Бога
The article deals with one of the most graceful and non-standard version of the modal ontological argument for existence of God proposed by analytic philosopher Stephen Makin in 1988. In his version he has succeeded to avoid the famous criticism of Kant the impossibility of using of the predicate ‘to exist’ as a “real”. Makin does not attempt to prove the necessary existing object; otherwise, he uses a concept of necessarily exemplified concept. He argues there is at least one (possibly unique) such concept - scilicet Anselm’s famous "that than which non greater can be conceived".
This study consists of three main parts: firstly, it is discussed Makin’s idea and version of the argument; secondly, it is analyzed the criticism which has been received from 1988 to 1991; thirdly, I present my own objections to Makin’s version, and to the criticism on it.
I will say something presently about three important points, namely: 1) there are no reasonable arguments in favor of the idea that class of necessarily exemplified concept is not empty; 2) there seems to be no plausibility to holding that the interchangeability of alethic modalities is sound here; 3) there are some additional difficulties that have been not previously mentioned in the analysis of evidence. In particular, the proof does not take into account the multilevel structure of the ontology, which hierarchy of levels, as a rule, determines what kind of entity exists in the ontology in the true sense of the word. In addition, Makin’s approach is well described in terms of Tichy’s "offices", which makes it impossible to worship God as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.