The paper is devoted to the contemporary discussions about the history of analytic philosophy, the criteria of its distinguishing as a philosophical movement and its present status. It is emphasized that its ambivalent attitude to Kant’s philosophy is important for understanding the character of analytic philosophy.
Theory of probability created in the 17th century thanks to the works of Pascal and Fermat has been for a long time a tool of professional mathematicians and wasn’t thought as an ability to anticipate rationally a social action. In the late 18th century, Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794) first proposed to apply the theory of probability to the moral and political disciplines creating a basis for social prognostication. The methods developed by him allowed to predict the results of political elections and formed the basis for the future social choice theory. However, ideas of Condorcet on the limits of the application of mathematical constructs in the social and moral sciences opens up opportunities for the exit abroad of social philosophy beyond the borders of speculative metaphysics and its development as a "practical" science serving man and the community. This paper also assesses the Condorcet’s ideas in history of probability calculus as a method description for the historical chronology. Character of Condorcet thinking about the broad of the opportunities for interdisciplinary use of mathematics allow us to compare his ideas with ideas of other philosophers of the Enlightenment (Rousseau, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Diderot), as well as with a number of Kant’s reasonings. Despite the fact that Condorcet was not familiar with his work, comparing their systems of ideas about autonomous subject, his reason and freedom, history and social progress testifies not only to overcome a number of Condorcet prejudices of his time, but also on alternative version of his social, ethical and political philosophy to Kant's theory of practical reason, as well as to the philosophy of history of the Enlightenment and German rationalism.
In this article, I consider Kant’s dichotomy between general and transcendental logic in light of a retrospective reconstruction of two approaches originating in 14th century scholasticism that are used to demarcate formal and material consequences. The first approach (e. g., John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen) holds that a consequence is formal if it is valid — because of its form only — for any matter. Since the matter of a consequence is linked to categorematic terms, its formal validity is defined as being invariant under substitutions for such terms. According to the second approach (e. g., Richard Billingham, Robert Fland, Ralph Strode, Richard Lavenham), the validity of a formal consequence stems from the formal understanding of the consequent in the consequence’s antecedent. I put forward the hypothesis that in his logical taxonomy, Kant attempted to reconcile the substitutional interpretation of formal consequences and a formal analysis of the transcendental relations of objects of experience. However, if we interpret the limitations imposed by transcendental logic on the power of judgement in the spirit of the scholastic ontology of transcendental relations, it would contradict Kant’s critique of dogmatic ontology. Following in Luciano Floridi’s path, I thus propose to consider transcendental logic, not as a system of consequences equipped with ontologically grounded transcendental limitations, but rather as the logic of design. The logic of design has the benefit of enriching traditional logical tools with a series of notions borrowed primarily from computer programming. A conceptual system designer sets out feasibility requirements and defines a system’s functions that make it possible to achieve the desired outcome using available resources.Kant’s project forbids a dogmatic appeal to the transcendental relations and eternal truths of scholasticism. However, the constitutive nature of the rules of transcendental logic in regard to the power of judgement precludes the pluralism of conceptual systems that can be interpreted within possible experience. Thus, the optimisation problem of finding the best conceptual design from all feasible designs is beyond the competence of transcendental logic.
The success of the so-called "ontological argument" prevents two important facts: 1) using the concept of existence as a real predicate, and 2) mixing of modalities de re and de dicto. This article deals with a way to overcome the first problem proposed by Czech logician Pavel Tichy.
The article deals with one of the most graceful and non-standard version of the modal ontological argument for existence of God proposed by analytic philosopher Stephen Makin in 1988. In his version he has succeeded to avoid the famous criticism of Kant the impossibility of using of the predicate ‘to exist’ as a “real”. Makin does not attempt to prove the necessary existing object; otherwise, he uses a concept of necessarily exemplified concept. He argues there is at least one (possibly unique) such concept - scilicet Anselm’s famous "that than which non greater can be conceived".
This study consists of three main parts: firstly, it is discussed Makin’s idea and version of the argument; secondly, it is analyzed the criticism which has been received from 1988 to 1991; thirdly, I present my own objections to Makin’s version, and to the criticism on it.
I will say something presently about three important points, namely: 1) there are no reasonable arguments in favor of the idea that class of necessarily exemplified concept is not empty; 2) there seems to be no plausibility to holding that the interchangeability of alethic modalities is sound here; 3) there are some additional difficulties that have been not previously mentioned in the analysis of evidence. In particular, the proof does not take into account the multilevel structure of the ontology, which hierarchy of levels, as a rule, determines what kind of entity exists in the ontology in the true sense of the word. In addition, Makin’s approach is well described in terms of Tichy’s "offices", which makes it impossible to worship God as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.
This article focuses on the problem of reconciling a priori and empirical dimensions of freedom, will, and action as the crucial point for understanding the relationship between theoretical and practical reason in Kant’s and Husserl’s practical philosophy. Relying on the explanation of the relationship between transcendental and practical freedom given in Kant's practical philosophy, the author problematizes Kant’s thesis about the primacy of practical reason. This is the startingpoint and leitmotif in analysing the nature of revision of Kant’s ideas, premises, and problems in the first draft of Husserl’s practical philosophy (scientific ethics). Comparative analysis reveals terminological and conceptual similarities and differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s practical philosophies. Another important result is identifying the principles and departure point ideas for both thinkers. These are a shared understanding of the relationship between theoretical and practical reason, the principle of the ‘purity’ of moral motives and compulsoriness of the a priori, the idea of parallelism between logic and ethics, the interaction between will and mind, and the determining role of the categorical imperative. The author stresses that an adequate understanding of the thinkers’ positions requires distinguishing between Kant’s transcendentalist perspective and Husserl’s phenomenological descriptive perspective, between the a priori of pure reason and the material a priori, between good will as a duty and the thetic acts of will, and between the absolute and relative compulsoriness of the categorical imperative. At the same time, the possibility of reconciling the obligatory and a priori greatest good with a concrete, practical situation of choice remains an open question.
This paper considers Kant’s transcendental philosophy as a special transcendental paradigm (a special type of philosophical research) differing from both the "objective" metaphysics of Antiquity and the "subjective" metaphysics of Modernity (the metaphysics of an object (transcendent metaphysics; meta—physics) — experience (transcendental metaphysics) — the metaphysics of the subject (immanent metaphysics; meta—psychology)). For this purpose, the author introduces such new methodological concepts as “transcendental shift” and “transcendental perspective” (see CPR, B25) and “transcendental constructivism” or “pragmatism” (see “acts of pure thinking" (CPR, B81)). This interpretation of transcendentalism is based on the cognitive-semantic reading of the Critique in the light of Kant’s question formulated in a letter to M. Herz (of February 21, 1772): “What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the object?” (R. Hanna) and the modern interpretation of Kant that was called the “two aspects” interpretation (H. Allison). Whereas classical metaphysics interprets knowledge as a relation between the (empirical) subject and the object, the transcendental metaphysics understands "possible experience” (Erfahrung) as a relation between the transcendental subject (transcendental unity of apperception) and the transcendental object. At the same time, unlike contemplative classical metaphysics, Kant’s transcendentalism is an "experimental" metaphysics, whereas the “transcendental” is defined as a borderline ontological area between the immanent and the transcendent, an “instrumental” element of our cognition and consciousness (cf. E. Husserl’s intentional reality and K. Popper’s three worlds).
The article contains an original attempt to create a transcendental theory (philosophy) of science (experience). The conceptual basis of the author’s position is the Kant’s transcendentalism as theory of experience and his original interpretation and development in new conditions. The author shows that the modern (postpositivistic and analytical) philosophy of science follow spirit of the Kant’s «Copernican revolution» as «the new method of thought» [CPR, B XVIII].
Kant's transcendentalism is associated with the study and substantiation of objective value as a human way of cognition as whole and individual kinds of our knowledge. This article is devoted to Kant’s understanding (substantiation) of mathematics as cognition via constructing of concepts. Unlike the natural sciences the mathematics is an abstract – formal cognition, “[its] thoroughness is based on definitions and axioms” [B754].
The article consequently analyzes each of these components. Mathematical objects are determined by the principle of Hume. Transcendentalism considers the question of genesis and ontological status of concepts. To solve them Kant suggests the doctrine of schematism, which is compared with the modern concepts of mathematics. We develop the dating back to Kant original concept of the transcendental constructivism (pragmatism) as the programme of substantiation of mathematics. We also give a brief comparison of the axiomatic method of Kant and Hilbert.
“Constructive” understanding of mathematical constructions (calculations) is a significant innovation of Kant. Thus mathematical activity is considered as a two-level system, which supposes a “descent” from the level of rational understanding to the level of sensual contemplation and a return “rise”. The article also examines the difference between the mathematical structures and logical proofs.
In his concept Kant highlights ostensive (geometric) and symbolic (algebraic) design. The article analyses each of them and shows that it is applicable to modern mathematics, in activity of which both types of Kant's constructing are intertwined.
Kant’s transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism) focuses on both the human method of cognition in general [CPR, B 25] and certain types of cognition aimed at justifying their objective significance. This article aims to explicate Kant’s understanding (resp. justification) of the abstract nature of mathematical knowledge (cognition) as “construction of concepts in intuition” (see: “to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it”; [CPR, A 713/В 741], which is “thoroughly grounded on definitions, axioms, and demonstrations” [CPR, A 726/В 754]. Mathematical objects, unlike specific ‘physical’ objects, are of abstract nature and are introduced (defined) within Hume’s principle of abstraction. Based on his doctrine of schematism, Kant develops an original theory of abstraction: Kant’s scheme serve as a means to construct mathematical objects, as an “action of pure thought" [CPR, B 81]. “Constructive” understanding of mathematical acts is a significant innovation of Kant. In this mathematical activity is considered as a two-level system, which supposes a “descent” from the level of concept understanding to the level of sensual intuition, where mathematical acts are performed, and a return “rise”. On this basis, we are developing theory of transcendental constructivism (pragmatism). In particular, Kant's "contemplation/intuition" of mathematics can be understood as the structural properties of mathematical language or its "logical space" (Wittgenstein; mathematical structuralism). In his theory Kant highlights ostensive (geometric) and symbolic (algebraic) constructing. The paper analyses each of them and shows that it is applicable to modern mathematics, in activity of which both types of Kant's constructing are intertwined. In the paper we also highlight as a third type of construction — the logical constructing [in proving theorems], which inherits the features of both Kant's types.