Digital Sovereigns and Vassals: The Battle for Digital Spaces as a New Foreign Policy Priority

Russia in Global Affairs. 2026. No. 3. P. 142–167.

Diskin E.

This article examines whether digital sovereignty can be sustained through domestic policy alone. Drawing on securitization theory, geoeconomics, the concept of weaponized interdependence, and regime complex theory, the article analyzes four cases: the U.S., the EU, China, and Russia. These actors confront different limitations on their control over the digital environment: insufficient regulation in the EU, counterproductivity of restrictions in Russia, limits on the foreign operations of Chinese companies, and the weakening of extraterritorial U.S. regulations. Direct-to-Cell satellite connectivity is unbundling territoriality and deepening the ineffectiveness of national gatekeeping. The article argues that Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept does not adequately respond to these challenges, and it calls for a proactive foreign policy on digital sovereignty, including a more active negotiating position vis-à-vis the U.S., cooperation within BRICS+ and the SCO, and the formation of an alternative regulatory regime.

Keywords: securitization (international relations), digital sovereignty, geoeconomics, digital platforms, Russian Foreign Policy, regime complex, Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell, unbundling of territoriality, weaponized interdependence

Publication based on the results of: Citizen-state interaction in the context of digital transformation: Political, psychological, and managerial factors and barriers (2025)