Влияние прогнозов финансовых результатов публичной компании на рыночную стоимость и волатильность ее акций на российском фондовом рынке
Most foreign studies find that the forecasts of financial performance of the company by its management have effect on return on its hares and theirs volatility, and that market reaction on the negative news is stronger. In Russia, management forecasts are typically publicized in the course of the conference calls made in the same days when the financial results are published. This practice makes the analysis of the short-term influence of the management forecasts on shares quotes impossible. This paper analyses the impact of corporate earnings guidance on the long-term return on shares and share price volatility as well as the impact of earnings surprises on the long-term shares’ return. The estimate was made based on the panel data for a sample of 27 Russian public metal mining companies and fertilizers’ producers for the period of за 2006–2011. Our study reveals no link between earnings guidance and return on shares as well as between earnings surprises and return on shares. At the same times share prices of companies which provide earnings guidance are more volatile than those which do not. Thus, an increase in transparency does not result in increased return on shares as compared to less transparent companies, but it increases share price volatility and risk associated with investments in such shares. This effect may mean that investors do not take into account the management forecasts of the Russian public companies. Those forecasts may be too inaccurate due to high volatility of business environment, absence of regulation of corporate forecasts’ disclosure and managers’s interest in overstating the forecasts.
Television (TV) stations forego millions of dollars of advertising revenues by airing tune-ins (preview advertisements) for their upcoming programs. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium as well as welfare properties of tune-ins in a duopolistic TV market that lasts for two periods. Importantly, each TV station is fully informed about its own as well as its rival's program. The receive information Viewers of The to Via tune-ins, the if the the the any, or alternatively by sampling the the a program for a FEW minutes (and across the the switching stations). I find that equilibrium tune-in decisions do not necessarily depend on TV stations' knowledge of their rival's program. In this case, the opportunity costs of tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins may be socially better. However, when tune-ins depend on both of the upcoming programs, it is possible that they enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of the inefficient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any tune-ins.
The purpose of political campaigns in democracies is to provide voters with information that allows them to make “correct” choices, that is, vote for the party/candidate whose proposed policy or “position” is closest to their ideal position. In a world where political talk is often ambiguous and imprecise, it then becomes important to understand whether correct choices can still be made. In this paper we identify two elements of political culture that are key to answering this question: (i) whether or not political statements satisfy a so-called “grain of truth” assumption, and (ii) whether or not politicians make statements that are comparative, that is contain information about politicians’ own positions relative to that of their adversaries. The “grain of truth” assumption means that statements, even if vague, do not completely misrepresent the true positions of the parties. We find that only when political campaigning is comparative and has a grain of truth, will voters always make choices as if they were fully informed. Therefore, the imprecision of political statements should not be a problem as long as comparative campaigning is in place.
The concept of transparency is one of key concepts in the modern researches and practices in economy, policy, sustainable development, resource allocation, corporate management, etc. Ensuring of transparency in society in general, and in the financial markets, in particular, is one of significant functions of many social and economic institutes, including institutes of accounting and finance. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the concept of transparency in finance and accounting. Institutional approach is applied in this research. The subjects of the analysis are practices of accounting, audit, disclosure of financial information and assessment of assets. The basic method of a research is critical discourse analysis. We consider the approaches to transparency determination, tools and mechanisms of its implementation in the financial sphere, the benefits and problems associated with practices of financial transparency. It is shown that the main mechanisms of transparency on financial markets are disclosure and publication of information about economic actors in public space, and the tools of financial transparency are financial accounting, financial reporting and audit. The main advantages of transparency are marked; they are the reduction of uncertainty in society and markets, the decrease of financial losses risks and a possibility of remote control. The problem aspects of excessive transparency are possible panic during the crisis periods and the support of procyclicality of the financial markets. The role of fair value assessment during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 is discussed. It is shown that fair value is not the reason of crisis, but its accelerator. In the conclusion the question of whether it is necessary to support the increase of transparency in the financial markets is discussed.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.