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Майнонг и майнонгианцы об онтологическом статусе «ничто»: проблема определения
The works of Alexius Meinong are dedicated to various strategies for describing existingand nonexistent things. An important role in his theory is played by the idea of a preju-dice in favor of the actual, which explains his desire to find a correct descriptionof the ontological status of nonexistent entities. He specifically examined things likethe round square, the existent golden mountain, and many others; however, his writingsshow nosigns or attempts to describe the ontological status of “nothing”. In this regard,one ofthe objectives of this study is to determine whether it is possible to provide a co-herent description of “nothing” while avoiding contradictions solely using the tools of histheory. Simultaneously, within contemporary analytical metaphysics, this concept has be-gun to be regarded as an independent object of investigation. Many representativesof the so-called nuclear school of Meinongian philosophy have attempted to address theproblem of “nothing” by formulating their own theories and approaches. Therefore, thispaper also examines such approaches to solving the problem of “nothing”, as presentedinthe works of Parsons, Routley, and Jacquette. Although Parsons and Jacquette devel-oped and interpreted Meinong’s ideas, they sought to adhere to the fundamental princi-ples of his theory, including the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear proper-ties.In this context, it is necessary to identify the merits and shortcomings of each ap-proach, as well as to compare their principles with the main tenets of the original. The problem of “nothing” becomes particularly relevant in the contextof the development of modern Meinongian theories, where the question arises aboutthepossibility of considering it as an intentional object in principle. How can we evenconceive of “nothing”? What properties might it have? We have attempted to addressthese questions in this study