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Распределенное единство: к вопросу о самостоятельности бюджетов в России
The article is devoted to the problem of the relationship between the principles of unity and independence in the construction of a budgetary system, which are also called the principles of the budgetary system. The first of the points of view is that unity is dominant because it determines the very existence of this system and corresponds to the constitutional principle of unity of the state. Another position is that the primary is the independence of budgets. This is also argued by constitutional provisions and is associated with the objective problem of ensuring the rights of local self-government, which is a matter of concern not only in Russia, but also in Western Europe, and correlated with the term "budgetary federalism." The problem is aggravated by the growth of the Russian budget system.
The author details the existing arguments in favor and against these positions and formulates a different point of view that these principles are actually not opposite, but complement each other.
In this regard, various arguments are made, including the provisions of system theory related to the isolation of monocentric and distributed systems and the concept of system scalability, which in the case of a budgetary system means striving to achieve its maximum efficiency without losing stability, for which one should constantly look for the optimal balance between the unity of the budgetary system and the independence of budgets.
The historical experience of regulating the budgetary system in the Soviet period of Russian history, that is, from the moment of its appearance, is also considered. At this time, a model of "socialist federalism" arose, the features of which should include the principle of democratic centralism, which was originally formulated for party building, but later began to be applied for state building. The legal connection between "socialist federalism," "democratic centralism" and the budgetary structure was established by the well-known USSR Law on Budgetary Rights of the USSR and the Union Republics of October 30, 1959. Democratic centralism also meant a balance between the antipodes - anarchism and bureaucratic centralism, or between collectivism and unity and, in fact, replaced both modern principles of unity and independence of budgetary systems.
The article also addresses the issue of the connection of optimal regulation of the budgetary independence of the regions and the problem of preventing secession in a federal state, which is always relevant for Russia. It is concluded that the proper allocation of the financial powers of the central and local authorities can act as an effective legal tool to prevent secession. At the same time, the content of such regulation will not be the allocation of additional funds to regions with separate trends, but, on the contrary, their involvement in national financial and economic relations.
As a general conclusion, the idea is formulated that the principles of unity and independence of the budgetary system are connected into a single whole and represent an eternal problem for a complex state to find a balance in the distribution of financial powers between the federal center, regional and local levels of government, in connection with which a simplified understanding of this issue should be abandoned.
More suitable to describe the combination of unity and independence in the construction of the budgetary system of Russia, the author believes the expression "distributed unity," when the basic property is the unity of the budgetary system, but autonomy is needed for its elements in order to achieve maximum efficiency of the financial activity of the state. Perhaps in this case it will be necessary to "complete" the budget system in order to create a balancing element, which was previously the state budget. In fact, the current "de facto" state of affairs should be corrected, when the federal budget, acting as the center and basis for the budget system, remains its ordinary element.