Понять нельзя помиловать: о парадоксальности этики у Кьеркегора и Витгенштейна

Vox. Философский журнал. 2017. № 22. С. 1–11.

Vinkelman A.

The present article deals with the problem of ethics unspeakability on L. Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. Both philosophers indicate a paradoxical situation of all our attempts to express ethics in language. On the one hand, the ethical discourse seems possible and even necessary. In fact, truly ethical can never be expressed. The ontology of the early Wittgenstein, which is presented in the "Tractatus logico-philosophicus" sets a ban on expressing ethical. Language, according to Wittgenstein, can describe only the facts of the world, but cannot say something about ethics. Kierkegaard, in turn, also talks about the impossibility of expressing the true value (for him it is religious faith, like Abraham of "Fear and Trembling"). It can be comprehended only as a paradox. The analysis of the ideas of these two thinkers provides an answer to the main question of the article: is a true understanding for philosophers (or even for ordinary people) possible or not? The author shows that, in agreement with Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, we have to give a negative answer. In the framework of the language, there is an only possibility of understanding the content of the main ideas and concepts.  The true understanding always remains unattainable, because it is based on the transcendental structure (as in Wittgenstein) or a paradox of faith (Kierkegaard)

Keywords: Иммануил Кант, Людвиг Витгенштейн, Immanuel Kant, метаэтика, Ludvig Wittgenstein, kierkegaard, кьеркегор, логико-философский