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О различных концепциях ценового равновесия в задаче пространственной конкуренции Хотеллинга
С. 218-220.
We consider a model of location-price competition between two firms, located on the circle. Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in secure strategies, and Nash-2 equilibrium are compared. We demonstrate that Nash-2 equilibrium exists for any locations of firms. The set of Nash-2 equilibria is treated as tacit collusion.
In book
СПб. : Издательство Нестор-История, 2014
Sandomirskaia M., , in : Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications. : Springer, 2016. P. 251-269.
We examine an equilibrium concept for 2-person non-cooperative games with boundedly rational agents which we call Nash-2 equilibrium. It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not only current strategies but also all profitable next-stage responses of the partners to her deviation from the current profile that ...
Added: October 3, 2016
Sandomirskaia M., / Высшая школа экономики. Series EC "Economics". 2014. No. 70.
We examine the novel concept for repeated noncooperative games with bounded rationality: ``Nash-2'' equilibrium, called also ``threatening-proof profile'' in (Iskakov~M., Iskakov A., 2012). It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not only current strategies but also the next-stage responses of the partners to her deviation from ...
Added: October 21, 2014
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Математическая теория игр и ее приложения 2016 Т. 8 № 1 С. 106-137
Исследуется игровое равновесие в сети, в каждом узле которой экономика описывается простой двухпериодной моделью Ромера эндогенного роста с производством и экстерналиями знаний. Сумма уровней знаний в соседних узлах вызывает внешний эффект в производстве каждого узла сети. Рассматриваются решения агентов в зависимости от получаемой экстерналии. Доказывается единственность внутреннего равновесия. Изучается роль пассивных агентов в формировании сети, ...
Added: April 29, 2016
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Скоблова Ю. А., В кн. : Государство и бизнес. Современные проблемы экономики. Материалы VIII международной научно-практической конференции. Том 1. Т. 1.: СПб. : РАНХиГС, 2016. С. 84-87.
We continue the study (Matveenko, Korolev, 2015) of a Nash equilibrium in network game with production and knowledge externalities. It is proved that in complete network equilibrium exists only when all agents are homogeneous. The necessary conditions for linking a node to the other one that is already steady in the network are analyzed. On ...
Added: February 24, 2017
Karpov A. V., / Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Series Economics Discussion Papers "Economics Discussion Papers". 2017. No. 2017-89.
Added: October 24, 2017
СПб. : Издательство СЗИУ РАНХиГС, 2018
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or ...
Added: September 15, 2018
Korolev A. V., Математическая теория игр и ее приложения 2021 № 1 С. 102-129
In this paper, stochastic parameters are introduced into the network games model with production and knowledges externalities. This model was formulated by V. Matveenko and A. Korolev and generalized two-period Romer model. Agents' productivities have deterministic and Wiener components. The research represents the dynamics of a single agent and the dynamics in a triangle which ...
Added: May 15, 2021
Petrov I., Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Политология 2021 Т. 23 № 4 С. 692-705
In the 2010s many moderate parties in Europe began to use the agenda of the farrights, competing with them on the same field. This article is devoted to the problem of inter-party competition in European countries amidst the rise of far-right parties. We also intended to check if the far-right profile is the same for all EU ...
Added: November 2, 2022
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Математическая теория игр и ее приложения 2017 Т. 9 № 3 С. 64-92
Рассматривается игра на сети, в каждом узле которой экономика описывается простой двухпериодной моделью Ромера эндогенного роста с производством и экстерналиями знаний. Сумма уровней знаний в соседних узлах вызывает внешний эффект в производстве каждого узла сети. Вводится понятие типа вершины сети; дается типология сетей в зависимости от типов вершин; показано, что внутренние игровые равновесия определяются указанной ...
Added: November 15, 2017
Rozanova N. M., Мигалев Я. А., AlterEconomics (ранее - Журнал экономической теории) 2015 № 1 С. 122-132
The article demonstrates a new approach to markets with product differentiation, that is of industrial design. Various concepts of industrial design as an effective instrument in modern competition are analysed. Factors of design competitiveness are shown. A Hotelling type model with industrial design is presented. It is concluded that using design as a tool of ...
Added: April 7, 2015
Sandomirskaia M., / Высшая школа экономики. Series WP7 "Математические методы анализа решений в экономике, бизнесе и политике". 2016. No. 1.
The paper examines an interaction of boundedly rational agents that are able to calculate their benefits after reaction of an opponent to their own deviations from the current strategy. Accounting for strategic aspects of interaction among players can be implemented as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. This is a possible compromise behavior: not ...
Added: March 3, 2016
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics 2017 Vol. 7 No. 4 P. 323-358
We study game equilibria in a network, in each node of which an economy is described by a two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbour nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Ways of behaviour of agent (passive, ...
Added: October 24, 2017
Sandomirskaia M., / Высшая школа экономики. Series EC "Economics". 2015. No. 93.
The paper examines an interaction of boundedly rational firms that are able to calculate their gains after reaction of an opponent to their own deviations from the current strategy. We consider an equilibrium concept that we call a Nash-2 equilibrium. We discuss the problem of existence and possible multiplicity of such equilibria, relation to infinite ...
Added: April 15, 2015
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., , in : Contributions to game theory and management / Ed. by L. A. Petrosyan, N. A. Zenkevich. Issue 8. St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2015. Issue 8.: St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2015. P. 199-222.
We consider a game equilibrium in a network in each node of which an economy is described by the simple two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node of the network obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbor nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Three ...
Added: September 22, 2015
Matveenko V. D., Гармашов И. А., Гармаш М. В. et al., В кн. : ГОСУДАРСТВО И БИЗНЕС. СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ЭКОНОМИКИ. МАТЕРИАЛЫ X Международной научно-практической конференциим 25-27 апреля 2018 года Санкт-Петербург. Материалы международной научно-практической конференции. Том 1. Т. 1.: СПб. : Северо-Западный институт управления РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ, 2018. С. 8-17.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or ...
Added: September 15, 2018
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Бахтин М. А., В кн. : Математика, статистика и информационные технологии в экономике, управлении и образовании. Ч. 1: Математика и статистика.: Тверь : Тверской государственный университет, 2016. С. 79-84.
This paper studies a model of game interaction on a network with externalities, in which agents choose their levels of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that the equilibrium level of investment is equal to the agent’s alpha centrality. Also, we ...
Added: February 23, 2017
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Бахтин М. А., В кн. : Государство и бизнес. Современные проблемы экономики. Материалы VIII международной научно-практической конференции. Том 1. Т. 1.: СПб. : РАНХиГС, 2016. С. 77-83.
This paper studies a model of game interaction with externalities on a network, in which agents choose their level of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that in both cases agents may be passive, active and hyperactive, and conditions for optimality ...
Added: February 24, 2017
Gasnikov A., Мендель М. А., Лагуновская А. А. et al., Труды Московского физико-технического института 2015 Т. 7 № 3
This paper describes some previously unexamined features in a multistage approach to transport modelling. The approach described is based on a theorem on the potentiality of the special population game that arises while the model of equilibrium fl ow distribution over paths and the model of correspondence formation are combined. ...
Added: October 23, 2015
Аевский В. В., Андрюшкевич О. А., Беленький В. З. et al., М. : ЦЭМИ РАН, 2012
The ninth issue of annual Collection of articles consists of four sections: “Analysis of actual economic processes”, “Modeling of financial and market mechanisms”, “Dynamic models”, “Discussions, Notes and Letters”. As a whole nine articles are presented ...
Added: February 13, 2014
Savina T., Известия Саратовского университета. Новая серия. Серия: Математика. Механика. Информатика 2011 Т. 11 № 2 С. 32-36
For n person games with preference relations some types of optimality solutions are introduced. Elementary properties of their solutions are considered. One sufficient condition for nonempty Ca-core is found. ...
Added: January 20, 2013
Vartanov S., М. : МАКС Пресс, 2018
Книга представляет собой учебное пособие, пригодное для первоначального ознакомления с математическим аппаратом некооперативной теории игр и некоторыми ее приложениями из математической экономики и социологии. Первая часть пособия посвящена теоретическим основам и приложениям биматричных игровых моделей. Во второй части излагаются базовые принципы построения и решения игровых задач с непрерывными множествами стратегий, а также иерархических и позиционных ...
Added: September 30, 2023
Gurvich V., Koshevoy G., Discrete Applied Mathematics 2018 P. 1-15
Given two finite ordered sets A and B, let O=A×B denote the set of outcomes of the following game: Two players, Alice and Bob, have the sets of strategies X and Y that consist of all monotone non-decreasing mappings x:A→B and y:B→A, respectively. It is easily seen that each pair (x,y)∈X×Y produces at least one deal, that is, an outcome (a,b)∈O such that x(a)=b and y(b)=a. Denote by G(x,y)⊆O the set of all such deals related to (x,y). ...
Added: October 10, 2018
Savina T., , in : Представляем научные достижения миру. Естественные науки: материалы научной конференции молодых ученых "Presenting Academic Achievements to the World". Issue 2.: Saratov : Издательство Саратовского университета, 2011. P. 71-74.
In this paper the basic properties of different types of equilibrium concepts in antagonistic games with various preference structures are considered. ...
Added: February 18, 2013
Savina T., Известия Саратовского университета. Новая серия. Серия: Математика. Механика. Информатика 2009 Т. 9 № 3 С. 66-70
Для игр с отношениями предпочтения мы рассматриваем в качестве принципов оптимальности равновесие по Нэшу, а также некоторые его модификации. Для описания оптимальных решений игр с отношениями предпочтения введены ковариантно и контравариантно полные семейства гомоморфизмов. ...
Added: January 20, 2013