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Анализ равновесий на цепях в сетевой игре с производственными экстерналиями
С. 84-87.
We continue the study (Matveenko, Korolev, 2015) of a Nash equilibrium in network game with production and knowledge externalities. It is proved that in complete network equilibrium exists only when all agents are homogeneous. The necessary conditions for linking a node to the other one that is already steady in the network are analyzed. On the basis of these results we deduce the conditions for equilibrium in prevailing kinds of networks: dyads and triads, according to their parameters.
In book
Т. 1. , СПб. : РАНХиГС, 2016
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics 2017 Vol. 7 No. 4 P. 323-358
We study game equilibria in a network, in each node of which an economy is described by a two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbour nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Ways of behaviour of agent (passive, ...
Added: October 24, 2017
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Математическая теория игр и ее приложения 2016 Т. 8 № 1 С. 106-137
Исследуется игровое равновесие в сети, в каждом узле которой экономика описывается простой двухпериодной моделью Ромера эндогенного роста с производством и экстерналиями знаний. Сумма уровней знаний в соседних узлах вызывает внешний эффект в производстве каждого узла сети. Рассматриваются решения агентов в зависимости от получаемой экстерналии. Доказывается единственность внутреннего равновесия. Изучается роль пассивных агентов в формировании сети, ...
Added: April 29, 2016
СПб. : Издательство СЗИУ РАНХиГС, 2018
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or ...
Added: September 15, 2018
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Математическая теория игр и ее приложения 2017 Т. 9 № 3 С. 64-92
Рассматривается игра на сети, в каждом узле которой экономика описывается простой двухпериодной моделью Ромера эндогенного роста с производством и экстерналиями знаний. Сумма уровней знаний в соседних узлах вызывает внешний эффект в производстве каждого узла сети. Вводится понятие типа вершины сети; дается типология сетей в зависимости от типов вершин; показано, что внутренние игровые равновесия определяются указанной ...
Added: November 15, 2017
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Бахтин М. А., В кн. : Государство и бизнес. Современные проблемы экономики. Материалы VIII международной научно-практической конференции. Том 1. Т. 1.: СПб. : РАНХиГС, 2016. С. 77-83.
This paper studies a model of game interaction with externalities on a network, in which agents choose their level of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that in both cases agents may be passive, active and hyperactive, and conditions for optimality ...
Added: February 24, 2017
Matveenko V. D., Гармашов И. А., Гармаш М. В. et al., В кн. : ГОСУДАРСТВО И БИЗНЕС. СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ЭКОНОМИКИ. МАТЕРИАЛЫ X Международной научно-практической конференциим 25-27 апреля 2018 года Санкт-Петербург. Материалы международной научно-практической конференции. Том 1. Т. 1.: СПб. : Северо-Западный институт управления РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ, 2018. С. 8-17.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or ...
Added: September 15, 2018
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., , in : Models, Algorithms and Technologies for Network Analysis, Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics. Vol. 156.: Switzerland : Springer, 2016. Ch. 19. P. 291-331.
We consider a game equilibrium in a network in each node of which an economy is described by the simple two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node of the network obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbor nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Three ...
Added: November 3, 2016
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Бахтин М. А., В кн. : Математика, статистика и информационные технологии в экономике, управлении и образовании. Ч. 1: Математика и статистика.: Тверь : Тверской государственный университет, 2016. С. 79-84.
This paper studies a model of game interaction on a network with externalities, in which agents choose their levels of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that the equilibrium level of investment is equal to the agent’s alpha centrality. Also, we ...
Added: February 23, 2017
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Automation and Remote Control 2019 Vol. 79 No. 7 P. 1342-1360
In each node of a network, economy is described by the simple two-period Romer’s
model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. The sum of knowledge
levels in the neighbor nodes causes an externality in the production of each node of the
network. The game equilibrium in the network is investigated. The agents’ solutions depending
on the size ...
Added: June 22, 2019
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., , in : Contributions to game theory and management / Ed. by L. A. Petrosyan, N. A. Zenkevich. Issue 8. St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2015. Issue 8.: St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2015. P. 199-222.
We consider a game equilibrium in a network in each node of which an economy is described by the simple two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node of the network obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbor nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Three ...
Added: September 22, 2015
Matveenko V. D., В кн. : Системное моделирование социально-экономических процессов: труды 37-ой Международной научной школы-семинара, г. Сочи, 30 сентября - 5 октября 2014 г. : Воронеж : Воронежский государственный педагогический университет, 2014. С. 44-56.
Обсуждаются подходы к моделированию взаимозависимостей в экономике, показаны сложности, которые возникают при анализе такого рода моделей. Представлен ряд полученных автором результатов, относящихся к зависимости состояния экономики от структуры экономической системы. Внимание уделяется таким технологическим характеристикам, как степень дополняемости факторов или усилий агентов, и сетевых характеристик системы. Мы прослеживаем это отличие на примерах моделей с промежуточными ...
Added: October 19, 2015
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Алфимова А. А., Научно-технические ведомости Санкт-Петербургского государственного политехнического университета. Экономические науки 2015 № 6(233) С. 206-215
We consider a network model of production with externalities which describes a situationtypical for many economic, social, and political systems. In the first period of time each of the agents in the network receives endowment and distributes it between consumption and investment. In the second period the agent’s consumption depends on its own investment as ...
Added: January 13, 2016
Networks Structure, Equilibria, and Adjustment Dynamics in Network Games with Nonhomogeneous Players
Гармаш М. В., Уткина А. А., Korolev A. V., , in : Contributions to Game Theory and Management Volume XII. Vol. XII.: ., 2019. P. 128-139.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects
the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when some agents
of the complete graph enter another full one. The solution of this problem will
allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding
whether to enter the other net, what conditions and externalities affect it
and ...
Added: September 29, 2019
Korolev A. V., Garmashov I., , in : Optimization of Complex Systems: Theory, Models, Algorithms and Applications. : Switzerland : Springer Publishing Company, 2020. P. 398-406.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when one of the complete graph enters another full one. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding whether to enter the other net, what conditions ...
Added: June 23, 2019
., 2019
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects
the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when some agents
of the complete graph enter another full one. The solution of this problem will
allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding
whether to enter the other net, what conditions and externalities affect it
and ...
Added: September 29, 2019
Switzerland : Springer Publishing Company, 2020
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when one of the complete graph enters another full one. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding whether to enter the other net, what conditions ...
Added: June 23, 2019
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., , in : Proceedings of the Fourth Russian Finnish Symposium on Discrete Mathematics. Issue 22.: University of Turku, 2017. P. 119-135.
We study game equilibria in a network, in each node of which an economy is described by a two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbour nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Ways of behaviour of agent (passive, ...
Added: June 8, 2017
СПб. : Северо-Западный институт управления РАНХиГС при Президенте РФ, 2018
В данной работе рассмотрена следующая проблема – что влияет на объем инвестиций в знания при
вхождении одной из фирм сети в другую инновационную сеть. Решение данной проблемы позволит
понять, как именно будут вести себя инновационные фирмы при решении вопроса о вхождении в
инновационную сеть другой страны или региона, какие условия на это влияют и как можно будет
предсказать уровень ...
Added: September 15, 2018
Korolev A. V., Matveenko V. D., Гармаш М. В. et al., В кн. : IX Московская международная конференция по исследованию операций (ORM2018). Москва, 22–27 октя- бря 2018 г. Труды. В двух томах. Т. 2: IX Московская международная конференция по исследованию операций (ORM2018). Москва, 22–27 октя- бря 2018 г. Труды. В двух томах.: М. : МАКС Пресс, 2018. С. 210-214.
В непрерывном времени ассматривается модель динамики инвестиций в знания при вхождении одной из фирм сети в другую инновационную сеть, например, сеть другой страны или региона. ...
Added: December 30, 2018
Matveenko V., Korolev A. V., Automation and Remote Control 2019 Vol. 80 No. 3 P. 556-575
This paper considers a network game as follows. In each node of a network, economy
is described by the simple two-period Romer’s model of endogenous growth with production
and knowledge externalities. The sum of knowledge levels in the neighbor nodes causes an
externality in the production of each network node. The concept of node type is introduced
and a ...
Added: June 22, 2019
Sandomirskaia M., / Высшая школа экономики. Series EC "Economics". 2014. No. 70.
We examine the novel concept for repeated noncooperative games with bounded rationality: ``Nash-2'' equilibrium, called also ``threatening-proof profile'' in (Iskakov~M., Iskakov A., 2012). It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not only current strategies but also the next-stage responses of the partners to her deviation from ...
Added: October 21, 2014
Korolev A. V., Automation and Remote Control 2022 Vol. 13 No. 1 P. 483-501
Stochastic parameters are introduced into a model of network games with production and knowledge externalities. The model was formulated by V. Matveenko and A. Korolev and generalizes Romer’s two-period model. The agents’ productivities have both deterministic and Wiener components. The research represents the dynamics of a single agent and the dynamics in a triangle that ...
Added: April 22, 2022
Yakovleva A. Y., Яремчук Р. Л., Научные исследования и разработки. Российский журнал управления проектами 2015 № 4 С. 3-11
Specific features of technological platform "Smart energy system of Russia" are analyzed in the article. The possibilities of program management adaptation to technological platform development are investigated. Specific context conditions and relationship in program are considered. Recommendations for program implementation directions are offered. ...
Added: January 12, 2016
Volkova I., Yakovleva A. Y., Вестник Тверского государственного университета. Серия: Экономика и управление 2014 № 4-1 С. 9-14
Motives of organization’ collaboration in the frames of technological platforms are analyzed in the article. Companies’ interactions are studied as interfirm networks, because firms activity in technological platforms can be considered as network structure. As a result of the research, revealed motives are classified according relational (reputation and social capital growth, network position taking) and ...
Added: December 19, 2014