Russia’s Foreign Policy After the Ukrainian Crisis

Washington Quarterly. 2025. Vol. 48. No. 4. P. 133–145.

Lukin V., Lukin A.

The Ukrainian crisis, like all past conflicts, will sooner or later come to an end, and Russia will continue its historical existence. This makes it possible, even now, to contemplate the question of what its foreign policy might look like in the post-crisis future. During the conflict, which has profoundly influenced not only the existence and consciousness of its elites but also broader public opinion, an extraordinary—though typical for such extraordinary historical moments—situation emerged. In Russia, from the dark depths of the collective consciousness, surfaced the most radical ideological constructs, once regarded as marginal.

It is unlikely that such sectarian excesses will extend beyond the temporal and historical bounds allotted to them. Russia will emerge from the current crisis, returning—by one means or another—to its natural state, as has occurred many times before. That state is determined by its centuries-old culture and geographical position, as well as by the contemporary level of its economic development and general potential: namely, the condition of a geographically Eurasian state, actively engaging with both Europe and Asia. The marginals will once again become marginal, and the mainstream will again be mainstream. This, however, does not imply that within these broad mainstream parameters there is no scope for diverse solutions and markedly different tactical nuances. In order to determine which of the possible options would be most realistic and optimal for Russia, it is first necessary to define the overarching historical objectives of its foreign policy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Keywords: Китай, внешняя политика, Россия, Европа, Russia, Europe, foreign policy, China, украинский кризис, Ukrainian crisis