«Искусство, которому нельзя предаваться от случая к случаю»: разум и насилие у Фукидида

Социология власти. 2025. Т. 37. № 3. С. 155–176.

Gulyaev R.

The article examines the problem of interconnection between strategic, political and technical aspects of organized violence in “History of Peloponnesian War” by Thucydides in its most complex and effective form – maneuver naval combat. According to Thucydides, it is the ability to conduct prolonged naval and land campaigns with ability to concentrate force and resources and to pose decisive long-term goals that distinguishes modernity from antiquity, civilization form barbarism and thus marks first major conflict between coalitions of Greek polices as a most significant event in human history. Our research proposes a new approach to Thucydides’ work, which views his description of struggle between Athens and Corinth for the control of Naupactus in 429–413 BC as a pivotal moment of the whole conflict. Small port controlling entrance to the Corinthian Gulf decides whether Athens can confine naval power of the Peloponnesian League or will maritime struggle become uncontrollable and present mutual threat to communication lines of both sides. This confrontation is the most complete and clear demonstration of technical features and capabilities of the main instrument of this form of violence – rowing fleet of triremes, as well as social, ethical and strategic aspects of the society which was capable of creating it. History of struggle in a specific theatre of a specific war develops into a universal statement about disclosure of human nature by means of organized violence, which influenced post-Thucydidean tradition of political thought.

Keywords: innovation, стратегия, strategy, инновация, насилие, violence, Фукидид, Thucydides