«Когда бы жизнь домашним кругом» в условных рассуждениях фрегевских безумцев и логических штрафников

Слово.ру: балтийский акцент. 2025. Т. 16. № 1. С. 125–139.

Lisanyuk E.

We advocate an idea that a necessary condition for a dispute about truth amounts not to the carriers of non-ideal logical thought, but to a variety of approaches to reconstructing the logical form of conditional reasoning, which implies diversification of methods for solving logical tasks. The relevance of the study is conveyed by discussions about logical aliens - fantastic mad-humans, in which Frege embodied his idea of the impossibility of denying the necessary nature of logical laws in the acquisition of truth, in the context of the remarkable diversity of formal logical tools for modeling argumentation and reasoning. Based on modern studies of conditional reasoning, using the example of Onegin’s conditional reasoning from a letter to Tatyana, we show that there are different ways of reconstructing it, including competing ones. In the spirit of Frege, we construct the concept of logical penalists - non-ideal thinkers of our “home circle”, who, due to their limited intellectual resources, are sometimes content with not the best results in reasoning and who turn out to be the only candidates to participate in a dispute about truth, as such disputes are possible with neither ideal thinkers nor logical aliens. The concept of logical penalists allows us to illustrate the idea that disputes are possible due not to the differences in opinions among humans, but to the variety of ways to justify them.

Keywords: fallacies, Кондиционалы, Триада Фреге, Frege’s triad, laws of logic, ошибки рассуждений, conditionals, demonstrative, probabilistic and nonmonotonic reasoning, логические законы, демонстративные, вероятностные и немонотонные рассуждения