События на Манежной: анализ преподавателей и студентов. Управление конфликтом как фактор канализации социального протеста в переходных обществах (на примере беспорядков декабря 2010 года в Москве)
Препринты Санкт-Петербургского филиала НИУ ВШЭ. Серия препринтов. Санкт-Петербургский филиал НИУ ВШЭ, 2012. № 1.
Урбанизация и политическая нестабильность: К разработке математических моделей политических процессов.
Added: Oct 15, 2014
Зинькина Ю. В., Коротаев А. В., Ходунов А. С. В кн.: Системный мониторинг глобальных и региональных рисков: Арабская весна 2011 года. М.: Либроком, 2012. С. 387-436.
Added: Oct 7, 2014
Edited by: Н. В. Уфимцева М.: ИЯ РАН, 2012.
Added: Mar 10, 2013
О методике оценки текущего состояния и прогноза социальной нестабильности: опыт количественного анализа событий арабской весны
Малков С. Ю., Кузьминова Е. В. Полис. Политические исследования. 2013. № №4. С. 134-162.
Added: Oct 9, 2014
Korotayev A., Vaskin I., Khokhlova A. et al. Political Science. PS. Высшая школа экономики, 2017. No. WP BRP 46/PS/2017.
Our empirical tests generally confirm the validity of the Olson - Huntington hypothesis suggesting a bell-shaped relationship between the level of economic development and the level of sociopolitical instability. According to this hypothesis, up to certain values of the average per capita income its growth tends to lead to increased risks of sociopolitical destabilization, and only in the upper range of this indicator its growth tends to be associated with the decrease of sociopolitical destabilization risks. Thus, for higher values of per capita income we deal with a negative correlation between per capita income and the risk of sociopolitical instability, and for lower values this correlation is positive. As a result, the maximum values of political instability tend to be observed in the mid-range of the GDP per capita spectrum rather than among the poorest or the richest countries. However, our analysis has shown that for various indices of sociopolitical destabilization this curvilinear relationship can be quite different in some important details. On the other hand, we detect the presence of a very important exception. We show that the relationship between per capita GDP and the intensity of coups and coup attempts is not curvilinear; in this case we are rather dealing with a pronounced negative correlation; a particularly strong negative correlation is observed between this index and the logarithm of GDP per capita. We demonstrate that this fact makes the abovementioned bell-shaped relationship with respect to the integral index of sociopolitical destabilization considerably less distinct and makes a very significant contribution to the formation of its asymmetry (when the negative correlation between per capita GDP and sociopolitical destabilization among the richer countries looks much stronger than the positive correlation among poorer countries). However, our analysis shows that for all the other indices of sociopolitical destabilization we do witness the bell-shaped relationship assumed by the Olson - Huntington hypothesis. On the other hand, for example, in relation to such indices, as political strikes, riots and anti-government demonstrations we deal with such an asymmetry that is directly opposite to that mentioned above - with such an asymmetry, when a positive correlation between GDP and instability for poorer countries is much stronger than the negative correlation for richer countries. An especially strong asymmetry of this kind is found for such an important index of social and political destabilization, as the intensity of anti-government demonstrations. Thus, we arrive at the following conclusions. (1) Different types of political instability events have different functional relationships to changing levels of GDP/capita. Some do have a curvilinear response, others have a monotonic one. They also are more frequent at certain ranges of GDP/capita that are not the same, but rather are particular to certain types of events. (2) These findings show that certain types of events are more common at lower levels of income and political development, while others are more common at mid-levels, and yet others (anti-government protests, strikes) are more common at higher levels. (3) The functional relationships are most often linear in rising stages, but exponential or logarithmic in their declines. There are thus generally strong asymmetries in how such events react to changes in GDP/cap in the lower vs. upper ranges. (4) The overall notion of a curvilinear relationship between instability and GDP/capita is thus too simple, obscuring important patterns that reveal a trajectory of varying kinds of instability developing and peaking at different levels of economic development.
Added: Jun 6, 2017
Соболева И. В. В кн.: Государственный суверенитет vs. право наций на самоопределение. М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2011. С. 113-127.
Added: Feb 28, 2013
Влияние налоговой политики на рациональность недропользования в условиях политической нестабильности
Манаков А. Г. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2006. № 02.
This article considers the relationship between government and private oil&gas company and analyses impact of different degrees of political instability. The model is elaborated which shows that in case of political instability and absence of government control over the methods of oil extraction, company would choose “predatory” methods of extraction. According to the model the “UKOS case” did a lot of harm to the current situation. The result followed from the fact that the government provided a high degree of political instability, i.e. increased the preference of “predatory” method of oil extraction and made regulation more complicated. The most important result of the model is a nonlinear effect of political instability on the required severity (measured by size of tax/penalty) of government policy. With stabilization of the political situation required severity of regulation increases to the certain level, after which regulation is not necessary.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Коротаев А. В., Исаев Л. М., Шишкина А. Р. и др. В кн.: Системный мониторинг глобальных и региональных рисков. Украинский разлом. Т. 6. М.: Учитель, 2015. Гл. 1. С. 4-19.
Added: Jan 22, 2016
Edited by: В. А. Ядов М.: КАНОН-пресс-Ц, 2001.
Added: Oct 22, 2013
Цыганова Л. А. Духовность. 2012. № 2. С. 242-249.
Added: Mar 25, 2014
Черных А. И. Политическая теория и политический анализ. WP14. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. № 03.
Added: May 3, 2012
Татарко А. Н. Психология образования в поликультурном пространстве. 2012. Т. 17. № 1. С. 47-55.
Added: Sep 12, 2012
Таллинн: Таллинн, 2012.
Added: Dec 26, 2012
Schang F. Key Terms in Logic. ISBN-10: 1847061141. Bloomsberry Academic, 2010
A definition of three logical concepts: "biconditional", "contingent", and "sentence".
Added: Nov 4, 2014
Proceedings of the Seventh conference on International Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC'10), Valletta, Malta, 17-23 May 2010
Valletta: ELRA, 2010.
Added: Dec 17, 2012
Скиперских А. В. Свободная мысль. 2005. № 8. С. 119-203.
Added: Oct 28, 2014
Черных А. И. Политическая теория и политический анализ. WP14. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. № 04.
Added: May 11, 2012
Тулякова И. И., Бочкарева Н. С. Мировая литература в контексте культуры. 2008. № 3(1). С. 150-154.
Added: Dec 11, 2014