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We experimentally study the effects of allotment—the division of an item into homogeneous units—in independent private value auctions. We compare a bundling first-price auction with two equivalent treatments where allotment is implemented: a two-unit discriminatory auction and two simultaneous single-unit first-price auctions. We find that allotment in the form of a discriminatory auction generates a loss of efficiency with respect to bundling. In the allotment treatments, we observe large and persistent bid spread, and the discriminatory auction is less efficient than simultaneous auctions. We provide a unified interpretation of our results that is based on both a non-equilibrium response to the coordination problem characterizing the simultaneous auction format and a general class of behavioral preferences that includes risk aversion, joy of winning and loser’s regret as specific cases. © 2016 Economic Science Association
Current research analyzes the status of fixed assets in the Russian Federation, coming to the conclusion of the critical situation of this aspect of economic development, studies economic - mathematical models of investment management aimed at expanding and changing the production, proposes ways of assessing the sustainability of the results. Analytical and concept-theoretical blocks of the article are supplemented by the practical example of the power tools manufacturer and by the development of practical recommendations for business owners who are facing the problem of production expanding.