The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.
The collecton contains paper accepted for the Seventh International Conference Game theory and Management (June 26-28, 2013, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its application to mamagement.
The volume may be recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.
Sited and reviewed in: Math-Net.Ru and RSCI. Abstracted and indexed in: Mathematical Reviews, Zentralblatt MATH and VINITI.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or region, what conditions affect it and how the level of future investments in knowledge can be predicted.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The main optimality concept for such games is concept of equilibrium. We introduce a notion of homomorphism for games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points of games which are in a homomorphic relation. The main result is finding covariantly and contravariantly complete families of homomorphisms.
The ninth issue of annual Collection of articles consists of four sections: “Analysis of actual economic processes”, “Modeling of financial and market mechanisms”, “Dynamic models”, “Discussions, Notes and Letters”. As a whole nine articles are presented
In Russia, chain stores have achieved considerable market power. In this work, we combine a Dixit–Stiglitz industry model with a monopolistic retailer in order to address the following questions: does the retailer always impair prices, variety of goods, and ultimately welfare? Which market structure is worse: Nash or Stackelberg? What should be the public policy in this area?
For n person games with preference relations some types of optimality solutions are introduced. Elementary properties of their solutions are considered. One sufficient condition for nonempty Ca-core is found.