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Formation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game
P. 188-199.
Levando D. V.
The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.
In book
Vol. 1975. , Aachen : CEUR-WS.org, 2017
St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2014
The collecton contains paper accepted for the Seventh International Conference Game theory and Management (June 26-28, 2013, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its application to mamagement.
The volume may be recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.
Sited and ...
Added: October 16, 2014
Levando D. V., / SSRN. Series "Working Papers". 2017.
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This paper suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a noncooperative game theory. Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition externalities. In this family, ...
Added: May 3, 2017
Levando D. V., / Высшая школа экономики. Series WP BRP "Economics/EC". 2017. No. WP BRP 157/EC/2017.
The paper defines a family of nested non-cooperative simultaneous finite games to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelties of the paper are: a definition of every games embeds a coalition structure formation mechanism. Every game has two outcomes - an allocation of players over coalitions and a payoff profile for ...
Added: February 3, 2017
Korolev A. V., Ougolnitsky G. A., International Game Theory Review 2023 Vol. 25 No. 2 Article 2350004
In this paper, we build and investigate cooperative games with different characteristic
functions (von Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, Gromova–Petrosyan) on the
base of symmetrical Cournot oligopoly game-theoretic models in normal form. We find
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for nonsymmetrical Cournot
oligopoly game-theoretic models in normal form. Also, we build and investigate coop27
erative three-player games with the same characteristic ...
Added: January 26, 2023
Shvarts D., Захаров А. В., Автоматика и телемеханика 2014
Рассматриваются некооперативные игры, в которых множество стратегий есть множество игроков, с которыми данный игрок готов вступить в коалицию. Рассмотривается аксиоматика функций, связывающих стратегии игроков и итоговое разбиение игровок на коалиции. Исследуются взаимосвязи между тремя наборами аксиом. В частности, вводится аксиома монотонности, при которой увеличение стратегии одного из игроков (то есть расширение множества игроков, с которыми ...
Added: October 22, 2014
Levando D. V., / Cornell University. Series arXiv "math". 2016. No. arXiv:1612.02344.
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure formation mechanism}. This mechanism portions a set of strategies of the game into partition-specific strategy domains, what makes every partition to be a ...
Added: December 8, 2016
Switzerland : Springer Publishing Company, 2020
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when one of the complete graph enters another full one. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding whether to enter the other net, what conditions ...
Added: June 23, 2019
Alexander S. Belenky, Bolkunov D. S., Energy Systems 2016 Vol. 7 No. 4 P. 663-698
Added: March 1, 2016
Аевский В. В., Андрюшкевич О. А., Беленький В. З. et al., М. : ЦЭМИ РАН, 2012
The ninth issue of annual Collection of articles consists of four sections: “Analysis of actual economic processes”, “Modeling of financial and market mechanisms”, “Dynamic models”, “Discussions, Notes and Letters”. As a whole nine articles are presented ...
Added: February 13, 2014
Savina T., , in : Представляем научные достижения миру. Естественные науки: материалы научной конференции молодых ученых "Presenting Academic Achievements to the World". Issue 2.: Saratov : Издательство Саратовского университета, 2011. P. 71-74.
In this paper the basic properties of different types of equilibrium concepts in antagonistic games with various preference structures are considered. ...
Added: February 18, 2013
Networks Structure, Equilibria, and Adjustment Dynamics in Network Games with Nonhomogeneous Players
Гармаш М. В., Уткина А. А., Korolev A. V., , in : Contributions to Game Theory and Management Volume XII. Vol. XII.: ., 2019. P. 128-139.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects
the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when some agents
of the complete graph enter another full one. The solution of this problem will
allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding
whether to enter the other net, what conditions and externalities affect it
and ...
Added: September 29, 2019
Savina T., Известия Саратовского университета. Новая серия. Серия: Математика. Механика. Информатика 2011 Т. 11 № 2 С. 32-36
For n person games with preference relations some types of optimality solutions are introduced. Elementary properties of their solutions are considered. One sufficient condition for nonempty Ca-core is found. ...
Added: January 20, 2013
Savina T., В кн. : Математика. Механика: сборник научных трудов. Вып. 13.: Саратов : Издательство Саратовского университета, 2011. С. 92-95.
В отличие от классической теории игр целевая структура игры с отношениями предпочтения задается не функциями выигрыша, а рефлексивными бинарными отношениями. Оптимальными решениями в данном классе игр являются равновесие, равновесие по Нэшу и допустимые (вполне допустимые) исходы. Результатом данной работы является ряд теорем о точном описании множества оптимальных решений (а именно, ситуаций равновесия и ситуаций равновесия ...
Added: February 18, 2013
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., Бахтин М. А., В кн. : Математика, статистика и информационные технологии в экономике, управлении и образовании. Ч. 1: Математика и статистика.: Тверь : Тверской государственный университет, 2016. С. 79-84.
This paper studies a model of game interaction on a network with externalities, in which agents choose their levels of investment. We compare two concepts of equilibrium: standard Nash definition and “Jacobian” definition of equilibrium with externalities. It is shown that the equilibrium level of investment is equal to the agent’s alpha centrality. Also, we ...
Added: February 23, 2017
Savina T., Известия Саратовского университета. Новая серия. Серия: Математика. Механика. Информатика 2009 Т. 9 № 3 С. 66-70
Для игр с отношениями предпочтения мы рассматриваем в качестве принципов оптимальности равновесие по Нэшу, а также некоторые его модификации. Для описания оптимальных решений игр с отношениями предпочтения введены ковариантно и контравариантно полные семейства гомоморфизмов. ...
Added: January 20, 2013
Филатов А. Ю., / Preprints.org. Series 02:43:16 "CEST". 2023.
The paper proposes a game theory model of price oligopoly with a heterogeneous product, where total demand depends linearly on the minimum market price. This model develops the Bertrand oligopoly for the case of imperfect price elasticity of demand. The most interesting result is an asymmetric Nash equilibrium with different prices and sales in the ...
Added: January 10, 2024
., 2019
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects
the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when some agents
of the complete graph enter another full one. The solution of this problem will
allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding
whether to enter the other net, what conditions and externalities affect it
and ...
Added: September 29, 2019
Pankratova Y., Petrosyan L., В кн. : Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 11548.: Springer, 2019. С. 685-696.
In the paper, a two-level infinitely repeated hierarchical game with one player (center) C0 on the first level and S1...Sn subordinate players on the second is considered. On each stage of the game player C0 selects vector x=(x1....xn) from a given set X, in which each component represents a vector of resources delivered by C0 to one of the ...
Added: October 26, 2019
Landeo C. M., Nikitin M., Ижмалков С., / Высшая школа экономики. Series WP9 "Исследования по экономике и финансам". 2012. No. 03.
This paper presents a strategic model of incentives for care and litigation under asymmetric informa tion and self-serving bias, and studies the effects of damage caps. We contribute to the behavioral economics
literature by generalizing the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept to environments with biased litigants.
Our main findings are as follows. First, our results suggest that self-serving bias ...
Added: December 16, 2012
Birkhauser/Springer, 2019
This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018) held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018. ...
Added: December 26, 2019
Matveenko V. D., Korolev A. V., , in : Contributions to game theory and management / Ed. by L. A. Petrosyan, N. A. Zenkevich. Issue 8. St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2015. Issue 8.: St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2015. P. 199-222.
We consider a game equilibrium in a network in each node of which an economy is described by the simple two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node of the network obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbor nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Three ...
Added: September 22, 2015
Savina T., , in : Contributions to game theory and management. Issue 4.: St. Petersburg : Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University, 2011. P. 421-432.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The cooperative aspect of a game is connected with its coalitions. The main optimality concepts for such games are concepts of equilibrium and acceptance. We introduce a notion of coalition homomorphism for cooperative games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points ...
Added: February 18, 2013
Khabibullina A., Известия Дальневосточного федерального университета. Экономика и управление 2017 Т. 4 № 84 С. 102-111
In the last decade, the model of conducting pharmaceutical business has undergone changes. Increased R&D spending and growing difficulty of researching and developing drug process encourage innovative companies looking for other ways to increase their value. The business landscape, where pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies operate, allows them to use a model of strategic partnerships, focused ...
Added: October 4, 2017
Pankratova Y., Petrosyan L., , in : Stability and Control Processes: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov. : Cham : Springer, 2022. Ch. 65. P. 447-455.
Added: June 5, 2022