This article provides an analysis of philosophical background of two-dimensionalism in general and some its particular variants. The paper demonstrates that two-dimensionalism should be treated not as artificial addition to conventional possible worlds semantics but as its natural generalization. It is also shown how ontological and epistemological problems (the correlation between primary and secondary intensions, apriority and necessity, the nature of «mixed» truths etc.) could be converted into pragmatic ones.
The present paper deals with the modal version of St. Anselm’s ontological argument (the so-called «modal argument», or MA, developed by N. Malcolm and A. Plantinga) and the logic used therein. The authors focus on the problem of conceptual connection between the logic of this argument and some implicit ontological and epistemological assumptions inherent in it.
There is a chronological study in this paper consisting of three parts: 1) the conception of simplicity of God maintained by St. Thomas Aquinas, 2) rejection of God’s simplicity undertaken by Alvin Plantinga, and 3) an attempt to return to the idea of the simplicity of God in modern analytic research.
The article describes some of the fundamental features of Edward Zalta’s Theory of abstract objects in connection with the problem of possible worlds, as well as the use of names as rigid designators. The main feature of Zalta’s Theory is the separation of the two types of predication of properties: one for concrete objects and the other for abstract ones. This approach allowed us to avoid certain paradoxes. In the theory of abstract objects possible worlds considered as abstract objects that are associated with propositional properties. Such an approach is not without appeal, but has some syntactical defects, leading to circularity in the definition of modalities and even the definition of identity relation.
The present paper deals with the problem of omnipotence in the context of an original version of possible worlds ontology developed by Alvin Plantinga. His conception of “de re” and “de dicto” is analyzed in connection with the problems of essentialism and transworld identification. Using the notion of TWD (“transworld depravity”) Plantinga claim to solve the logical problem of evil, this solution being the part of his famous FWD (“free will defense”) program. Plantinga’s strategy is to confine the notion of omnipotence step by step with rational arguments. But some of his technical concepts are not clear-cut enough and some of his philosophical speculations are rather scholastic.
The problem of interpretation of comparative predicates in intensional is analyzed. While standard first-order modal logic is quite powerful, it cannot express some simple patterns of comparative cross-world predication. The starting point of the analysis is the joke about yacht size in Russell’s “On denoting”. Numeral, objectual, and mentalist interpretations are compared. I then apply the extension of first-order modal logic developed by Wehmeier to allow for cross-world predication in doxastic context. In the conclusion an account of cross-world predication based on two-dimensional account is proposed.