Book chapter
Какие фирмы участвуют в поставках по госзаказам в России?
С. 449-459.
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Balsevich A. A., Pivovarova S. G., Podkolzina E. Economics. EC. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 01.
Transparency is often prescribed as a cure for almost all the diseases of modern society, but it is not quite clear why and how it might solve certain problems. In the paper we explore how transparency of the public procurement system in Russian regions is correlated with competition, corruption, and control, key factors that influence outcomes of procurement procedures. Using publicly available information, we construct several indicators that measure availability and usability of different types of information presented on regional public procurement websites. Indices based on these indicators show significant differences in transparency levels between Russian regions. In the empirical part of the paper we show that the transparency of information is significantly and negatively correlated with the level of corruption in the region and increases the utilization of control mechanisms in Russian public procurement. We also show that more transparent systems are associated with higher levels of competition.
Added: Aug 28, 2012
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Быкова Д. А., Зороастрова И. В. В кн.: Сборник статей по материалам IX научно-технической конференции студентов и преподавателей НИУ ВШЭ – Нижний Новгород «Современные проблемы в области экономики, менеджмента, бизнес-информатики, юриспруденции и социально-гуманитарных наук». Н. Новгород: Нижегородский филиал НИУ ВШЭ, 2011. С. 31-35.
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Podkolzina E., Voytova T. I. Public Administration. PA. Высшая школа экономики, 2011. No. 01.
The main goal of public procurement reform in Russia, initiated in 2005, was to prevent corrupt deals between suppliers and procurers. That is why the public procurement law favors formal mechanisms to govern most of the stages of procurement: the procurer is not allowed to take into account the reputation of the supplier when he announces calls for bids and selects the supplier, and he is prescribed to use the legal system (courts) if he is not satisfied with the contract performance. Since the efficiency of formal institutions is not very high, these mechanisms are complemented by a “formalized informal instrument” - blacklisting opportunistic suppliers, which is believed to substitute for reputation mechanisms when formal mechanisms are weak. In this paper, we show how and why the institutional environment in Russia makes the blacklisting of opportunistic suppliers irrelevant. We explore how the percentage of contract breaches out of the total number of signed contracts is related to corruption and transparency measures for Russian regions. We also argue that such factors as measurement costs, verification costs, length of contracts and lawsuit amounts influence the probability of winning a legal action for a contract breach.
Added: Aug 27, 2012
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