Закон «О защите конкуренции» и политическая экономия антимонопольной политики в России
Edited by: Е. Г. Ясин Кн. 2. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2009.
Павлова Н. С., Shastitko A. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 58/EC/2014.
The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous effects, including the destruction and prevention of welfare enhancing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results help understand the negative impact the hostility tradition resulting in type I enforcement errors can have on social welfare when applied to the regulation of horizontal agreements.
Added: Sep 28, 2014
Added: Dec 8, 2015
Тотьев К. Ю. В кн.: Модернизация экономики и глобализация: В 3 кн. Кн. 3.. Кн. 3. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ, 2009. С. 636-644.
Added: Aug 19, 2013
Марковская Е. И., Троицкая И. В., Медведь А. А. и др. М.: Юрайт, 2017.
Added: Jul 5, 2016
Шаститко А. Е., Курдин А. А. Вопросы экономики. 2012. № 1. С. 84-95.
Added: Feb 9, 2013
Collusion in markets characterized by one large buyer: lessons learned from an antitrust case in Russia
Shastitko A., Golovanova S. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. WP BRP 49/EC/2014.
This paper demonstrates that even established and verified facts of agreements among producers are not a sufficient condition for cartel identification and, as a consequence, prosecution of agreement participants. Such requires looking at institutional details and the wider context of these and similar appearances or occurrences of documents and actions when qualifying the actions of market participants and their effects. This paper discusses a recent antitrust case brought against Russian manufacturers of large diameter pipes (LDPs) that examined supposedly abusive practices by these firms that were contrary to the law on the Protection of Competition, which prohibits market division. An analysis of the materials in this case using modern economic theory indicates that the presence of collusion is inconsistent with the active participation of the main consumer of LDPs in that agreement. The chosen format for the cooperation between pipe manufacturing companies and OJSC Gazprom, namely indicative planning, may be explained from the perspective of reducing contract risk in an environment characterized by large-scale private investments.
Added: Feb 12, 2014
Авдашева С. Б., Шаститко А. Е. В кн.: XII Международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества. В четырех книгах. Книга 4.. Кн. 4. М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2012. С. 187-197.
Added: Jun 5, 2012
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Щукина Л. Б. В кн.: . Гл. Кейс 27. С. 188-211.
Added: May 21, 2013
Comparative Analysis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness
Makarov A. Public Administration. PA. Высшая школа экономики, 2014. No. 20.
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of BRICS, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia) in the creation of antitrust institutions was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice. This article analyzes such enforcement problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions (“per se” vs “rule of reason”), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities etc. Main challenges for policy effectiveness in this field were shown
Added: Dec 4, 2014
Иванова Е. В. Регламентация банковских операций. Документы и комментарии. 2009. № 5. С. 102-109.
Added: May 16, 2013
Кизилов В. В. Экономическая политика. 2011. № 1. С. 131-136.
Added: Oct 10, 2012