### ?

## Manipulability of Aggregation Procedures for the Case of Large Numbers of Voters

Manipulation is a situation when an agent misrepresents his/her preferences to obtain a better result of an aggregation procedure. It was proven in literature, that there is no non-dictatorial aggregation procedure which is non-manipulable. A number of papers studying the degree of manipulability of aggregation procedures have been published since then. Such papers either look for theoretical formulae for particular cases or use computer modelling for empirical estimations. In case of computer modelling, only small numbers of voters are considered in the literature, usually up to 10, 30 or 100 agents. We use computer modelling to obtain the values of manipulability indices for the case of large numbers of voters, for example, for the cases of 100-10000 voters. The obtained results allow to make empirical approximations of the manipulability of aggregation procedures and to find out the least manipulable ones.