Россия: институциональный провал
The efficiency of social reforms in different countries mostly depends on the extent to which they can be accepted by people. Moreover, even if the problems are similar, the reasons may differ, which can lead to fail in applying existing laws of one state to another one. Bribery, as shows the Corruption Perception Index, calculated by Transparency International, is a typical problem for developing countries – that also matches research (Levin & Satarov, 2000; Ilzetzki, 2010) concluding that corruption has roots in socialist regimes and that in recently established political stability instable economic situation leads to growth in crime. The main problem within the scope of this project is to identify the relation between corruption perception and level of trust in the society and to distinguish the differences in factors affecting these characteristics in post-soviet countries. The research discoveres that distrust matters a lot for the problem in Russia and suggests further examining European countries in order to explain the difference in trust.
Institutions affect investment decisions, including investments in human capital. Hence institutions are relevant for the allocation of talent. Good market-supporting institutions attract talent to productive value-creating activities, whereas poor ones raise the appeal of rent-seeking. We propose a theoretical model that predicts that more talented individuals are particularly sensitive in their career choices to the quality of institutions, and test these predictions on a sample of around 95 countries of the world. We find a strong positive association between the quality of institutions and graduation of college and university students in science, and an even stronger negative correlation with graduation in law. Our findings are robust to various specifications of empirical models, including smaller samples of former colonies and transition countries. The quality of human capital makes the distinction between educational choices under strong and weak institutions particularly sharp. We show that the allocation of talent is an important link between institutions and growth.