Направления совершенствования разработки государственной стратегии в России к 2030 году
In this article history of university periodicals is approached as a history of practices of state administration, self-regulation of university corporation, professional self-organization, and normalization of different aspects of the university life. Research for this article has been carried out in the archives of Moscow University and Kazan University, and in the manuscript divisions of these universities’ libraries, as well as in the Archive of the Ministry of Public Education. Documents preserved in these collections reveal intentions of the publishers and circumstances surrounding the appearance of various periodicals in the first half of the nineteenth century. Another group of historical sources analyzed in this article consists of publications in university periodicals themselves. The authors show how the state policies regulating the market of the university press, on the one hand, and initiatives of university professors, on the other, influenced the configuration of the corporation of the university faculty, its internal hierarchies and accepted criteria of academic excellence. The article seeks to answer the question how politics and content of university journalism stimulated academic competition and created reputations.
The article is devoted to historical continuity in the state governing. Issues of existing analogies in the process of forming of system and structure of executive bodies in Russia are considered. The special attention is given to a combination of branch and functional approaches to the organization of executive bodies at different historical stages. In the context of the presumption of "Ideally uniform government" questions of a parity of powers of monarch and ministers in the Russian empire and of the President and the ministries in the Russian Federation are mentioned.
The idea of ligalization of bribe giving for certain types of bribes was expressed by K. Basu in 2011 and got a name Basu proposal. In this paper we discuss effects that can be caused by the direct implementation of this proposal. Our game-theoretic model shows that while legalisation of certain bribe-giving occurances can lead to some positive consequences, it is not always a good idea to return bribe to the bribe-giver as suggested by Basu. The chance to get the paid bribe back increases the amount of bribes that end up in corrupt officials' pockets.