Anticorruption Legislation and Individual Propensity to Bribery in Russia
The purpose of the current research is to provide empirical evidence for the relations between macroeconomic, political and legislative factors and grassroots corruption in Russia. The dominating goal of the research is to analyze the dynamics of factors, that create incentives for passive bribery at individual level and to reveal if there are structural breaks in the model related to the changes in anticorruption laws. Empirical part of the research is mainly based on the data of the "Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE”-2006.
The dominating goal of the research is to analyze the factors, creating incentives to manipulate the economic and political environment to increase personal wealth. Empirical part of the research is mainly based on the data of the "Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE”-2006
The author offers an analysis of the Russian market theses services.
In this paper the public-private wage gap is estimated by means both of the OLS and the quantile regression, which will provide a more complex picture of the distribution of the public-private sector wage gap. The author finds the existence of significant public-private wage gap (about 30%) considering both observable and unobservable characteristics of workers and jobs. Using the decomposition based on quantile regression helps to answer the question about the nature of the wage differences. The author comes to the conclusion that the main reason for the gap is the institutional mechanisms of public sector wages in Russia. The analysis is based on the data from Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) 2000-2010.
The idea of ligalization of bribe giving for certain types of bribes was expressed by K. Basu in 2011 and got a name Basu proposal. In this paper we discuss effects that can be caused by the direct implementation of this proposal. Our game-theoretic model shows that while legalisation of certain bribe-giving occurances can lead to some positive consequences, it is not always a good idea to return bribe to the bribe-giver as suggested by Basu. The chance to get the paid bribe back increases the amount of bribes that end up in corrupt officials' pockets.
The publication includes articles related to International scientific and practical conference dedicated to the interaction of the ruling elite and the systemic opposition in modern Russia and abroad, which was held in the Volga Institute of Management named after PA Stolypin (Saratov), 5-6 September 2012