Механизмы защиты от оппортунизма на электронных рынках услуг
This paper develops a strategy for investigating the new institutionalism in economic sociology. An analytical scheme is proposed to link institutional arrangements, structure of incentives, and conceptions of control. Questions regarding the legitimacy of claims on resources and profits, contract enforcements, and business networking are discussed on the theoretical level.
Based on a sample of 5,784 Russian-speaking respondents, this study provides the first quantitative evidence on freelance contracting via the Internet. We explore the extent to which these virtual business relations are formal or informal, and the role of social capital and
networking. Our data suggest freelancers act under constant threat of malfeasance from clients. We address a number of questions associated with freelancers’ business risks and how freelancers might mitigate them. The logistic regression models reveal that the virtualization of relationships with clients is associated with greater moral hazard risks and fewer opportunities for dispute resolution. Formal written contracts do not prevent opportunistic behaviors by clients, though such contracts help resolve conflicts. Dealing with available social contacts and referrals decreases both the probability of extreme opportunism, causing financial losses, and the probability that disputes remain unresolved. Nevertheless, established social relations could be exploited by clients who
can delay payments or insist on altering deadlines, work scope and specifications. Thus, our findings contribute to existing literatures on social capital in freelance contracting and on the structure of occupational labor markets.
One of the measures implemented as a part of administrative reform in Russia was the introduction of administrative procedures — special rules for providing government services that specify the process, the timing, the sanctions, etc, which can be used by bureaucrats for coordinating their activities, and by their principals (higher ranking bureaucrats and citizens) to control their agents. The main idea behind the administrative procedures was to increase the transparency of bureaucracies that provide government services, to simplify the control over bureaucrats, to prevent corruption, and, consequently, to increase the quality of government services. But after a few years since the introduction of administrative procedures we still face the problem of low accountability of bureaucrats. Thus, the main goal of the paper is to show whether administrative procedures can solve the problem of bureaucrats’ opportunism, and if they can, what are the key determinants of their effectiveness. To answer the question we provide two simple models of interaction between bureaucrats and citizens, and bureaucrats of different ranks, and describe the links between the models, to show how the introduction of administrative procedures influences the outcome of the interaction between the agents. We also define the set of parameters that can make administrative procedures a real means of control over bureaucrats and thus lead to better quality of government services.